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PREFACE 
 
This book presents a modern framework for understanding and improving 
agrarian sustainability and its governance. It incorporates the interdisciplinary 
New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, 
Organization, Law, Sociology, and Behavioral and Political Sciences), and 
suggests a new framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance of agrarian 
sustainability. Moreover, it discusses all available mechanisms affecting 
individual and collective actions for achieving economic, social, environmental, 
and intra and inter-generational goals of sustainable development including 
formal and informal institutions (“rules of the game”), "invisible hand of market" 
(market competition), individual initiatives (codes of behavior), contractual 
arrangements (private order), "visible hand of the manager” (fiat), collective 
decision-making (collective order), government intervention (public order), 
multinational actions (international order) and hybrid modes. The book provides 
effective tools for understanding, analyzing and improving public policies, 
business strategies, and individual and collective actions for sustainable 
development. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
This book is dedicated to my mother, my wife and my son, who all were very 
patient and supportive during the long years I needed to understand the agrarian 
governance and sustainability. 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The governance of agrarian sustainability is among the most topical issues in 
academic, business, and policy debates in developed, transitional, and developing 
countries [Daily et al.; EC; OECD; Raman; Salazar and Rios; UN; VanLoon et 
al.]. It is widely recognized that the achievement of economic, social, 
environmental, intra and inter-generational goals of sustainable development 
requires an effective social order (governance) and coordinated actions at various 
levels (individual, organizational, community, regional, national, and 
transnational). The governing mechanisms that could be effectively used include a 
mixture of “invisible hand of market” (market order), individual initiatives and 
contracts (private order), “visible hand of the manager” (fiat), collective decision-
making (collective order), government intervention (public order), multinational 
actions (international order), and hybrid modes.  
It is also known that the effective forms of governance of agrarian 
sustainability are rarely universal and there is a huge variation among different 
countries, regions, sub-sectors, etc. Experience shows that different societies 
achieve to a different extent the economic, social, environmental, etc. goals of 
sustainable development. That is a result of the specific governing structures 
which affect, in dissimilar ways, individual’s behavior, gives unlike benefits, 
commands different costs, and leads to diverse actual performances. Despite that, 
institutional aspects are largely ignored and a “normative” approach dominates 
while the costs of governance are not included into analyses. Consequently, the 
potential of market and private governing modes for the specific economic, 
institutional and natural environment in each country, region, sub-sector and eco-
system cannot be properly assessed, nor the effective modes for public 
(government, UN, EU, international assistance, etc.) interventions in agrarian 
sphere designed.  
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Research on mechanisms of governance of agrarian sustainability is at the 
beginning stage due to the “newness” of the problem, and the emerging new 
challenges for the governance, the fundamental modernization during the last two 
decades, and the “lack” of long-term experiences and relevant data. Most studies 
are focused on the governance of an individual (economic or social or 
environmental) aspect of sustainability, or on formal modes and mechanisms. 
What is more, they are typically restricted to a certain form (contract, cooperative, 
an industry initiative, or a public program), or a management level (farm, eco-
system, or public), or a particular location (region).  
Besides, uni-sectoral analyses are broadly used in separating the governance 
of farming from the governance of overall households and rural activities. 
Moreover, “normative” (to some ideal or external model) rather than comparative 
institutional approaches between feasible alternatives are employed. Likewise, the 
significant social costs associated with the governance, known as transaction 
costs, are not (or only partially) taken into consideration. Furthermore, uni-
disciplinary approaches dominate, and efforts of researchers in economics, 
organization, law, sociology, ecology, technology, and behavioral and political 
sciences are rarely united to deal with that complex matter. Lastly, there are few 
studies on specific institutional, economic, cultural, natural, etc. factors 
responsible for the big variation among countries, regions, industries, and 
organizations.  
Consequently, our understanding on the institutional, behavioral, 
technological, ecological, international, etc. factors of the governance of agrarian 
sustainability is impeded. Neither the spectrum of feasible formal, informal, 
market, private, public, integral, multilateral, transnational, etc. modes of 
governance can be properly identified, nor their efficiency (potential and limits), 
complementarities, and prospects of development correctly assessed. All these 
restrict our capability to assist improvement of public policies and modes of 
intervention, and to support individual, business and collective actions for 
sustainable development. 
This book incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and 
Transaction Costs Economics (combining economics, organization, law, 
sociology, behavioral and political sciences) and suggests a new framework for 
analysis of mechanisms of governance of agrarian sustainability.  
The first part of the book discusses the modern concepts of agricultural 
sustainability and the economics of agricultural sustainability. After that, it 
presents a new framework for analysis and improvement of the governance of 
agrarian sustainability. This new approach takes into account the role of specific 
institutional environments;  the behavioral characteristics of individual agents; the 
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transaction costs associated with the various forms of governance; the critical 
factors of agrarian activity and exchanges; the comparative efficiency of market, 
private, public and hybrid modes; the potential of farming structures for 
adaptation; the comparative efficiency of alternative modes for public 
intervention; the complementarities between different modes and the needs for 
multilateral and multilevel governance; and the role of technological and 
ecological factors. 
The second part of the book identifies the specific modes for environmental 
governance in Bulgarian agriculture; accesses the efficiency of market, private 
and public forms of governance; and estimates the prospects for evolution of 
environmental governance and farms’ sustainability in the conditions of EU CAP 
implementation. 
This book aims to give insights on modern understanding of agrarian 
governance and sustainability, elaborate a holistic framework for analysis and 
improvement of the governance of agrarian sustainability, and test this new 
approach in the complicated Bulgarian agriculture. In addition, diverse (positive 
and negative) examples from different countries are widely used to support the 
arguments of the author. However, the book has no intention to provide a 
comprehensive picture and solution of the complex problem of agrarian 
governance and sustainability in the great variety of specific (market, institutional, 
agro-ecological, etc.) conditions around the globe. 
I am enormously thankful to Nova Science Publishers, Inc. for giving me the 
extraordinary opportunity to present my work on agrarian governance and 
sustainability to the larger world audience. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1. GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
 
1. UNDERSTANDING AGRICULTURAL 
SUSTAINABILITY 
 
1.1. CONCEPT OF AGRARIAN SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Sustainability movements evolved in developed countries as a response to 
concerns about the impacts of agriculture on the depletion of non-renewable 
resources, soil degradation, health and environmental effects of chemicals, 
inequity, declining rural communities, loss of traditional values, food quality, 
workers’ safety, decline in self-sufficiency, decreasing number of farms, etc. 
[Edwards et al.]. Very often the “sustainable” agriculture is used as an umbrella 
term of “new” approaches to “conventional” (capital-intensive, large-scale, 
monoculture, etc.) agriculture, and includes organic, biological, alternative, 
ecological, low-input, biodynamical, regenerative, etc. agriculture.  
More recently the “social” issues such as modes of consumption and quality 
of life; decentralization; community and rural development; gender; intra (“North-
South”) and inter-generation equity; preservation of agrarian culture and heritage; 
improvement of nature; ethical issues (like animal welfare and the use of GM 
crop), etc. all have been incorporated into the sustainability concept [VanLoon et 
al.].  
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit addressed the global problem of sustainable 
development and adopted the declaration of its “universal principles” [UN]. They 
comprise: rights on healthy and productive life in harmony with nature for every 
individual; protecting the rights of future generation; integration of environmental, 
social and economic dimensions at all levels; international cooperation and 
partnerships; new international trade relations; application of precaution approach 
in respect to environment; polluter liability; environmental impact assessment; 
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recognition of women, youth, and indigenous roles and interests; and peace 
protection, etc. The emergence of that “new ideology” has been associated with a 
considerable shift of the “traditional paradigm” of development. Besides the 
economic growth, the latter has incorporated a broad range of social, ethical, 
environmental conservation, etc. goals. 
Apart from that general description, more “operational” definitions for 
sustainability have appeared. For instance, sustainability is often defined as a “set 
of strategies”. Management approaches that are commonly associated with the 
agrarian sustainability are: self-sufficiency through use of on-farm or locally 
available “internal” resources and “know-how;” reduced use or elimination of 
soluble or synthetic fertilizers; reduced use or elimination of chemical pesticides 
and substitution of integrated pest-management practices; increased or improved 
use of crop rotation for diversification, soil fertility and pest control; increased or 
improved use of manures and other organic materials such as soil amendments; 
increased diversity of crop and animal species, reliance of a broader set of local 
crops and local technologies; maintenance of crop or residue cover on the soil; 
reduced stocking rates for animals; and full pricing of agricultural inputs and 
charges for environmental damages, etc. [Mirovitskaya and Ascher]. 
However, interpreting the sustainability as “an approach” is not always useful 
for “guiding change in agriculture”. Firstly, the fact that some forms of agriculture 
are more enabling factor in ecological, social or economic sustainability (more so 
than in others) does not mean that sustainability is inherent to any particular set of 
practices, technologies, farming systems or policies. Secondly, strategies, which 
emerge in response to the problems in developed countries, may be inappropriate 
in the regions where circumstances and problems are quite different (e.g. 
underdeveloped, developing or transitional countries). Thirdly, it may lead to the 
rejection of some approaches associated with conventional agriculture, but 
nevertheless, enhance sustainability. Next, it makes it impossible to evaluate the 
contribution of a strategy of sustainability since that particular approach has 
already been used as a “criterion” for defining the sustainability. Finally, because 
of the limited knowledge during implementation of a strategy, it is likely to make 
errors, ignoring some that enhance sustainability or promoting others that threaten 
(long-term) sustainability. 
Another concept that characterizes the sustainability of agricultural systems is 
the  “ability to satisfy a diverse set of goals through time” [Hansen; Raman]. The 
goals generally include provision of adequate food (food security), economic 
viability, maintenance or enhancement of natural environment, some level of 
social welfare, etc. However, there are usually “conflicts” between different 
qualitative goals that creates problems of assessment. Thus, there are needs for 
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integration, ranking, and trade-offs. Besides, “subjectivity” of the specification of 
goals links the criteria for sustainability with the value of pre-set goals (e.g. the 
interests of stakeholders, the priorities of development agencies, the standards of 
analysts, etc.) rather than to the agricultural system itself. Lastly, at the low levels 
of analysis (parcel, farm, eco-system, sector, and region), most of the objectives 
are exogenous and belong to a larger system. 
A number of authors interpret sustainability as the “ability (potential) of the 
system to maintain or improve its functions” [Hansen; Mirovitskaya and Ascher; 
VanLoon et al.]. Accordingly, the main system attributes that influence 
sustainability are specified as: resilience; survivability; profitability; productivity; 
quality of soil, water, and air; energy efficiency; wildlife habitat; quality of life; 
and social acceptance, etc. Indicators for the measurement of all these attributes 
are identified and their time trends evaluated. Since trends represent an aggregate 
response to several determinants that eliminate the need to devise aggregation 
schemes. –this is a sentence fragment. I would replace “Since” with “These” 
Usefulness of that definition comes from suggesting operational criteria for 
sustainability, providing a basis for identifying constraints and evaluating various 
approaches to the improvement of agrarian sustainability. The most common 
critiques are: that it is impossible to find a single measure for different attributes; 
that future states of the system cannot be approximated by the past trends; and that 
the needs and the goals of human actors within the system are ignored.  
Having in mind the constantly evolving feature of the sustainability concept 
and the dynamism of the agricultural system itself, sustainability is increasingly 
perceived as a “process of learning about changes and adapting to these 
changes” [Raman]. According to that new understanding, agricultural 
sustainability is always specific to a time, situation, and component, and refers to 
the capability of agricultural systems to evolve and endure by adapting to and 
accommodating changes over time and in space. Furthermore, that inbuilt 
dynamism of the systems also includes a feasible “finite life” (no system is 
sustainable forever) as an agricultural system is considered sustainable if it attains 
its expected life span. 
We believe that sustainability has to be a criterion for guiding changes in 
policies, farming and consumption practice, agents’ behavior, focusing of research 
and development priorities, etc. Therefore, the definition of sustainability has to 
be based on the “literal” meaning of sustainability – thus perceived as a system 
characteristic and “ability to continue (maintain) over time”.  
Besides, the characterization has to be “system-oriented” while the system is 
to be clearly specified, including its time and spatial boundaries, components, 
goals, and context in the hierarchy. What is more, it is to include taking into 
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account the adaptation potential of the major system’s elements to the evolving 
natural and social environment. Moreover, our approach has to allow a 
comparative analysis of the different agricultural systems1.  
The characterization of sustainability must be also predictive since it deals 
with future changes rather than past and present. And finally, it should be 
diagnostic, and to focus on intervention by identifying and prioritizing constraints, 
testing hypotheses, and permitting assessments in a comprehensive way.  
 
 
1.2. ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
The problem of sustainability has been always an important part of the 
economic theory. Most often it is discussed in relation to inefficiency of using 
common natural resources (“tragedy of commons”) [Hardin], and to “negative 
externalities” associated with some activities [Pigou]. In recent years, it is 
increasingly associated with the multi-functionality (joint production character) of 
agriculture [OECD, 2001]. 
When common ownership and “open access” to natural resources exists, there 
is a tendency for inefficient use (or “overuse”) of resources. For example, there 
are certain natural limits for “sustainable” exploration of a meadow for livestock 
farming or a pond for fishing or irrigation. The long-term efficiency (output) 
would decrease if the number of animals that graze or fish that are caught 
increases beyond these norms of an effective natural reproduction. In a one-person 
farm or private ownership, there will be no conflict between the efficiency and 
sustainability. Here, maximization of the output over time will always be achieved 
through “simple” production planning and management.  
However, in a situation of multiple users and open access, there are strong 
individual interests for overusing the common resources since the private costs are 
not proportionate to the private benefits. In that case, individuals get full output 
from increasing the number of grazing animals (or fish caught), while bearing  a 
small portion of the overall decrease in the total yield as a result of over-
exploitation. Consequently, a constant overuse (non-sustainability) and low long-
term efficiency comes out as a result of this form of organization of natural 
resources. In the modern (globalized) world, a great number of the natural and 
                                                        
1
 Certain authors wrongly associate the comparability with a “continues (quantitative) rather than 
discrete property” of a system [Hansen]. In fact, there is no reason to believe that sustainability 
of an agricultural system could only increase or decrease. Discrete features (“sustainable”-“non-
sustainable”) are possible, and of importance for the farm managers, interests groups, and policy 
makers [Bachev and Peeters].  
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environmental resources have been increasingly affected by the “tragedy of 
commons”, and the water crisis, biodiversity crisis, global warming, etc. are top 
on the agenda. 
Nonetheless, the “tragedy of commons” could be avoided by an alternative 
institutional arrangement [Ostron]. For instance, an introduction of a public 
regulation on the exploitation of natural resources, such as distribution (and 
enforcement) of quotas for farmers and fishermen, would maintain sustainability. 
In other instances, the privatization of natural resources would be an effective 
solution since it would create strong private incentives for the long-term 
preservation of resources. In the latter case, a private agent (the owner) would 
regulate, contract and control an effective and sustainable use of the limited 
natural resources. 
Another classical case of “market failure” for the allocation and sustainable 
use of natural resources is caused by the negative externalities of certain activities. 
The free-market prices do not always reflect the effect on a third party’s welfare, 
and that is why they cannot govern effectively the resource allocation and uses. 
For instance, the price of livestock products does not comprise the costs of the 
pollution of underground water by the farm activity. Since private agents (farmers 
and consumers of farm products) do not pay the full price of the costs associated 
with their activity, they are not interested in the most effective (and sustainable) 
use of natural resources. Maximization of the social output and welfare cannot be 
achieved, and an inefficient allocation and overuse of resources, and unsustainable 
development come out as a result. Thus, efficiency and sustainability of some 
elements of the system (e.g. farms) are in conflict with the efficiency and 
sustainability of the other elements of the system (e.g. consumers) or the system 
as a whole.  
Therefore, an elimination of the differences between the “social” and 
“private” prices (“internalization of externalities”) through taxes, norms, etc. is 
commonly suggested. Besides, various monetary and nonmonetary2 methods for 
the “evaluation of environmental resources and costs” are developed and used in 
the analysis of overall efficiency. At the same time, the effectiveness of suggested 
methods is questioned because the role and services of the natural resources are 
not always known, and the entire “social” (present and future) value could be 
rarely properly evaluated. Besides, monetary assessments and dollar calculations 
of the majority of negative externalities (such as the adverse “impact” on human 
health and life; the “value” of lost biodiversity; the “exhausting” of non-
                                                        
2
 E.g. eco, carbon, energy, water, etc. footprints. 
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renewable resources, etc.) does not often make sense since they are not socially 
acceptable (no “trade-off” is possible).  
Coase has proved that the problem of “social costs” does not exist in a world 
of zero transaction costs and well-defined private rights [Coase, 1960]. The 
situation of maximum efficiency is always achieved independently of the initial 
allocation of rights. If, for instance, a farmer has the “right to pollute”, the 
affected agents would pay him an appropriate “bribe” (equal to the lost income or 
welfare) to stop the polluting activity. If the opposite is true and the farmer does 
not have the “right to pollute”, then the farmer would pay the appropriate bribe to 
other agents to let him pollute. In either case, the welfare of all agents is 
maximized and the maximum efficiency (known as Pareto optimum) reached 
without a need for any public intervention.  
However, when transaction costs are significant, then costless negotiation and 
exchange of rights is not possible. Therefore, the initial allocation of the property 
rights between individuals is critical for the overall efficiency and sustainability3. 
What is more, when important rights are not well-defined, then the high costs 
could block the efficient use of resources and/or (mutually) beneficial exchanges. 
Consequently, the institutional structures for carrying out the agrarian activities 
become an important factor, which eventually determines the outcome of the 
system (the efficiency) and the type of development (sustainability) [Bachev, 
2007].  
“Jointness of production” is a fundamental characteristic of farming. A 
classic example is when a market-oriented farm produces “multiple products” 
such as corn and hogs, and feeds corn to the hogs. That is caused by the 
opportunities for a more productive use of resources (economy of scale and scope) 
or as a risk-reduction strategy of the farm manager (diversification, integration of 
critical transactions, etc.). In modern farming, there are also outputs, which are 
less desired such as wastes, (soil, water, air, and noise) pollution, etc.  
And, finally, the farming output consists of both “private” and “public goods” 
such as food, rural amenities (hunting, landscape, etc.), ecological and cultural 
services, habitat for wildlife, biodiversity, etc. A great part of the farm’s “non-
commodity” outputs is “not-separable” from the major farming activities. 
Moreover, for these (public, quasi public, and collective) goods, no markets exist 
or, if they do, they function very poorly. Since these outputs are not “tradable” 
(profitable), farmers have no incentives to produce them on a socially-demanded 
scale. For the effective execution of such “public” functions of farms and for the 
                                                        
3
 For instance, when rights on critical resources or activities are not held by the most efficient user, 
development could significantly be impeded– conflicts between landlords and tenant-farmers, 
unproductive monopolies, etc. 
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production of the appropriate amount of the positive and negative externalities by 
the agriculture, it is necessary to develop and apply other (non-market) modes for 
governance [Bachev, 2007]. 
The division and specialization of labor, and related exchange and 
cooperation, opens up enormous opportunities for increasing the productivity and 
welfare of individuals and society4. It produces additional value (better resource 
management, bigger output, maximum economies of scale and scope) and creates 
incentives for deepening individual’s specialization and exchanges. Furthermore, 
it leads to a division of traditional agrarian activity and the development of huge 
new sectors of the economy-agrarian research and innovation, agrarian inputs 
production, agricultural services, proper farming, processing of farm products, 
marketing of farm and food products, agrarian crediting, agrarian insurance, etc.5  
However, it also increases (inter)dependency between individuals (demand, 
opportunistic behavior, and monopoly situation) and replaces or minimizes 
traditional “dependence from nature”. What is more, today this dependency is not 
anymore restricted to sectoral and national borders. For example, the level of 
agrarian sustainability in certain countries or regions of South America, Africa 
and Asia is heavily dependent on the development of biotechnology, the state of 
the economy, and funding or demand for specific (low-cost, origins, organic, and 
fair-trade) products in North America and Europe.  
Farming specialization is also responsible for some environmental problems 
in certain countries such as soil degradation (practicing constant mono culture); 
destruction of biodiversity; waters, soils and air pollution (enormous livestock and 
manure concentration); water shortages (big water demand); adverse impact of 
valuable eco-systems (e.g. tropical rainforests), etc. 
Above and beyond, the specialization and exchange is associated with 
additional (transaction) costs. The genial insight of Coase is that there are “costs 
of using the price mechanism” [Coase, 1937] which have fundamentally reshaped 
modern economic thinking6. The high costs of outside exchange make it more 
profitable to carry out division and cooperation of labor (a transaction) within an 
organization (firm or group farm) instead of across the market. For instance, a 
specialized livestock farm internally organizes a crop (forage) production activity 
                                                        
4
 Economic advantages from division, specialization and cooperation of labor at national and 
international scales have been among the fundaments of the political economy for more than 
200 years. 
5
 What is more, it is estimated that growing “transacting sectors” comprise the greatest part of  
developed economies such as the USA [North] and Germany [Furuboth and Richter] 
6
 If transaction costs were zero, then the governance of production and other (e.g. environmental 
preservation) activity could be done through direct interactions between individuals on market 
without any internal or collective organization. 
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(hiring additional labor and farmland) because of the significant costs and risks 
for market procurement of forage. 
Nevertheless, the internal management of transactions is also associated with 
costs (for directing, stimulating and supervising hired labor; for coordination and 
controlling the activity of partners), which restricts the unlimited expansion of 
borders of an organization7. Thus, a transaction will be carried in an organization 
if the costs are lower than for governing that transaction across market or in 
another organization.  
Consequently, the distribution of overall (agrarian) activities between 
different farms, organizations, and markets is determined by the comparative costs 
for using various governing arrangements as the most efficient one(s) (minimizing 
internal and external transaction costs) will tend to prevail [Bachev, 2004]. 
Ultimately, emergence, existence, evolution and the size of any free choice 
(contractual, economic, professional, political, etc.) organization could be 
explained by transaction cost minimizing (rather than technological) reason 
[Williamson]. Moreover, both (current) costs for using individual transacting 
forms and the long-term costs for their development (initiation, maintenance, 
modernization, and liquidation) have to be taken into account [Bachev, 2004]. 
The “discovery” of transaction costs significantly changed the way the 
economic problem (“effective allocation of resources”) is addressed and solved: 
“Indeed it is obvious that once there is shift from a “frictionless” universe scare 
resources have to be used to effect transactions, protect property rights and so on. 
This means that system’s total resource endowment can no longer be devoted 
solely to the production of normal commodities” [Dahlman].  
The recognition of transaction costs also has a number of important policy 
implications. Firstly, the role of the government is to establish institutions 
facilitating and intensifying market and private transactions – for identification, 
protection, and disputing individual (absolute and contracted) rights (e.g. notary, 
courts, police, etc.); quality, labor, eco, etc., standards; appropriate market 
infrastructure (wholesale markets, market and price information), etc. Secondly, 
when high transaction costs impede or block otherwise efficient transactions, the 
government is to intervene through assistance, regulations, funding, provision, 
etc. to make that socially desirable activity8 possible or more efficient. Thirdly, 
                                                        
7
 Otherwise, all agrarian activity could be managed in a single nationwide company. Actually, that 
experiment was made and failed in communist countries in East Europe. 
8
 The particular value (and priority) that individual communities and societies give on diverse 
agrarian resources, activities, outputs and services are quite specific at any moment of time, and 
depend on socio-economic development, endowment with natural resources, culture, progress in 
science, public education and awareness of potential benefits and hazards, etc.  
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public involvement in market and private activity is to be undertaken only if there 
is a net benefit (saving on transaction costs) compared to total (implementation 
and transaction) costs of public intervention. 
The principal role of the governance for the character and the pace of 
development is recognized (“governance matters”) and intensely studied [Coase; 
North; Furuboth and Richter; Williamson]. The specific institutional environment 
in which activity takes place eventually determines the level of economic 
performance and the sustainability in different industries, regions, countries or 
periods of history. The factors for the emergence and evolution of various types of 
institutions are quite specific for each society (community), and require a 
multidisciplinary analysis and explanation [North]. In the long-run, the 
institutions are endogenous parameters of the system and the institutional 
“development” is to be included in the model along with the economic, social and 
environmental components.  
On the other hand, in the specific institutional environment, the 
“sustainability” of various market, private, collective, etc. modes of governance 
will depend on the comparative efficiency of the alternative governing 
arrangements [Bachev, 2007]. However, a high efficiency and sustainability of the 
different governing forms (farms, business organizations, collective actions, and 
public forms) does not always mean a high efficiency and sustainability of the 
development. As North and Williamson have proved, the history of institutional 
development is full of examples of “failures” while the (business) organization 
modernization is usually a success story [North; Williamson]. Furthermore, the 
high sustainability of (inefficient) public forms is a result of the high transaction 
costs for their reformation (political decision-making and bargaining) and/or the 
“inefficiency by design” making that transformation complicated [Williamson].  
Today, “multi-functionality” of agriculture is socially recognized, and the 
sustainability is considered both as a criteria and a goal (outcome) of the 
development. It is also recognized that sustainability cannot be effectively 
achieved as a “side result” of totally decentralized actions (free market 
competition, contracting, and collective initiatives). The sustainable development 
requires effective governing and enforcement mechanisms, including a significant 
public involvement in market and private activities at local, national, transnational 
and global9 levels.  
Therefore, the analysis of the governance mechanisms for agrarian 
sustainability becomes essential both for defining the efficiency (potential and 
                                                        
9
 The term “global governance” (of security, trade, financial, environmental, etc. matters) is among 
the most commonly used new jargons of politicians, media, interest groups, etc. 
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limits) of market competition and private sector initiatives as well as for designing 
the most effective modes for public (governmental, international, etc.) 
interventions in the agrarian sector [Bachev, 2007].  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1. “INSTITUTIONS MATTER” 
 
Institutions are the “rules of the game”, and they determine individual’s rights 
in society and the way the property rights10 are enforced [Furuboth and Richter; 
North].  
The spectrum of rights could embrace the material assets, natural resources, 
intangibles, certain activities, labor safety, clean environment, food security, intra- 
and inter-generational justice, etc. Part of the property rights are constituted by the 
formal laws, regulations, standards, court decisions, etc. In addition, there are 
important informal rules determined by the tradition, culture, religion, ideology, 
ethical and moral norms, etc. The enforcement of various rights is done by the 
state (administration, court, and police) or other mechanisms such as community 
pressure, trust, reputation, private modes, self-enforcement, etc.  
The institutional analysis is not interested in de-jure rights but in the  de-facto 
rights individuals and groups possess. For instance, the “universal principles” of 
sustainable development have been declared (1992 Rio Earth Summit) and 
accepted by most countries. However, the extent of adaptation, respect of related 
rights, and their practical enforcement vary significantly among countries.  
The specific institutional environment affects human behavior and directs 
(governs) individuals’ activities “in a predictable way” [North]. It creates 
dissimilar incentives, restrictions and costs for intensifying exchange, increasing 
productivity, inducing private and collective initiatives, developing new rights, 
                                                        
10
 While lawyers distinguish between property and human rights, for the economists, all rights are 
property rights [Furuboth and Richter]. 
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decreasing divergence between social groups and regions, responding to 
ecological and other challenges.  
For example, socially acceptable norms for the use of labor (employment of 
children, safety standards, and minimum wages), plant and livestock (animal 
welfare, preservation of biodiversity, and usage of GM crops), and environmental 
resources (water use rights and permissions for pollution), all could differ even 
between various regions of the same country11. The specific institutional structure 
eventually determines the potential for and the particular type of development in 
different communities, regions, and countries12. 
The institutional “development” is initiated by the public authority, 
international actions (agreements, assistance, and pressure), and the private and 
collective actions of individuals. It is associated with the modernization and/or 
redistribution of the existing rights, the evolution of new rights, and the 
emergence of novel (private, public, and hybrid) institutions for their 
enforcement. For instance, sustainability initially evolved as “movements” and a 
“new ideology” in developed countries. Afterward, this “new concept” extended 
and was instituted in the body of formal laws, regulations and public support 
programs. Numerous decentralized initiatives of producers and consumers have 
become wide-spread in recent years (e.g. codes of ethical behavior, organic 
farming, system of fair-trade, etc.), as they are an important part of (pushing up) 
the institutional modernization in the area.  
The diverse institutional environment contributes to a different extent in 
achieving economic, social, environmental, etc. goals of sustainable development.  
If, for instance, the private rights are not well-defined, enforced, or are 
restricted, then that would limit the intensification of exchange and the overall 
economic development. Indeed, the rights regarding major agrarian resources 
were not well-defined during the post-communist transition in Bulgaria and that 
led to the domination of low productive, unsustainable and “gray” structures, 
ineffective use of large national resources, and serious economic, social and 
environmental problems in rural areas [Bachev, 2006] The classic examples of the 
importance of institutional structure are associated with the previously mentioned 
“tragedy of commons” and negative externalities.  
                                                        
11
 In Valonia, for instance, the environmental standards are much more restrictive than in the other 
two Belgium regions - Flandria and Brussels [Sauvenier at al.]. 
12
 A major reason for transforming the communist system was the low incentives for innovation and 
increasing productivity in economy based on public ownership on material, intellectual and 
natural capital.  
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In certain cases the important role of institutions on agrarian sustainability 
can even be observed from the sky13.  
Thus, the “institutions matter” and the analysis of sustainability is to be done 
in the specific institutional, rather than in an unrealistic (“normative”or  
desirable), context. The weakness of the latter approach has been strongly 
criticized: "The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly 
presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ 
institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from 
comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between 
alternative real institutional arrangements. In practice, those who adopt the 
nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real, 
and if discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Users of the 
comparative institution approach attempt to asses which alternative real 
institutional arrangement seems best able to cope with the economic problem" 
[Demsetz].  
Nevertheless, the institutional aspect is commonly missing in most of the 
suggested frameworks for analyzing and assessing agrarian sustainability. 
Accordingly, non-feasible norms, rather than the real-life arrangements, are used 
as criteria – e.g. the farming model in other (e.g. developed, neighboring) 
countries, the assumption for perfectly defined and enforced property rights, the 
effectively working public (local, state, and inter-governmental) organizations, 
etc. Therefore, an analysis of the structure and the evolution of the real or other 
feasible institutional arrangements for carrying out the agrarian activities has to be 
included in the model [Bachev, 2004].  
 
 
2.3. THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
The New Institutional Economics gives new insight on the efficiency of a 
diverse market, private, public and mixed modes of governance, and on their 
potential to deal with agrarian sustainability [Bachev, 2004; Bachev, 2007]. This 
                                                        
13
 For foreign visitors it was striking to see the large areas of abandoned agricultural lands and 
dispersed small-plots of farming during the transitional “institutional vacuum” in Bulgaria (in 
sharp contrast with countries with well-defined property rights). Good satellite images of 
“outcomes of eco-management under different institutional settings” have been presented at 
recent NATO ARW showing dissimilar levels of intensification of farming in both sides of 
USA-Mexico border [Rochon] and positive eco-results after introduction of property rights on 
trees in Niger in the 1990s in distinction to neighboring Nigeria [Staes].  
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new approach requires embracing all modes of governance affecting individual’s 
behavior which includes: 
 the institutional environment (the “rules of the game”) – this is the 
distribution of rights and obligations between individuals, groups, 
communities and generations, and the system(s) of enforcement of these 
rights and rules. In modern society, a great deal of the individual’s 
activities and relations are regulated by some (general or more specific) 
formal and informal rules. However, there is no perfect system of preset 
outside rules that can govern effectively all activities of individuals in all 
possible (and quite specific) circumstances of life and relations. 
 the market modes – these are various, decentralized initiatives governed 
by the free market price movements and market competition (e.g. 
spotlight exchanges, classic contracts, production and trade of organic 
products and origins, system of fair-trade, etc.). The importance of the 
“invisible hand” of the market for the effective coordination and 
stimulation of individual’s activities has been one of the fundamentals of 
the modern economy (and policies for development and globalization). 
However, there has also been a great number of “market failures” 
compromising the sustainable development, which has led to social 
crises, economic crises, ecological crises, energy crises, etc. 
 the private modes (“private or collective order”) – these are diverse 
private initiatives and specially designed contractual and organizational 
arrangements governing bilateral or multilateral relationships between 
private agents (e.g. voluntary individual or collective actions, codes of 
professional behavior, environmental contracts, eco-cooperatives, etc.). 
There has been emerging a great number of private and collective forms 
managed by the “visible hand of the manager”,—collective decision-
making, private negotiations, etc.—successfully governing various 
aspects (and challenges) of sustainable development. Nevertheless, there 
exists abundant examples of “private sector failures” (lack of potential to 
coordinate and stimulate sustainability), demonstrating the incapability to 
deal effectively with the problems of development.  
 the public modes (“public order”) – these are various forms of a third-
party public (government, community, and international) intervention in 
market and private sectors such as public guidance, public regulation, 
taxation, public assistance, public funding, public provision, etc. The role 
of the public (local, national and transnational) governance has been 
increasing along with the intensification of the activity and exchange, and 
the growing interdependence of the social, economic and environmental 
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activities (and related problems and risks). In many cases, the effective 
organization of certain activity through a market mechanism (price 
competition) and/or a private negotiation would take a long period of 
time, be very costly, could not reach a socially desirable scale, or be 
possible at all. Thus, a centralized public intervention could achieve the 
willing state of the system faster, cheaper and/or more efficiently. 
Nonetheless, there has been a great number of bad public involvements 
(inaction, wrong intervention, over-regulation, etc.) leading to significant 
problems of sustainable development around the globe. 
 the hybrid forms – some mixture combining features of the market and/or 
private and/or public governance (e.g. the state certifies the organic 
producers and enforces the organic standards, and thus intensifies the 
development of organic markets and environmental sustainability). 
 
In a one-person world, there is no need for (any) governance since the 
sustainable relations between that person and nature are achieved through a 
simple (production and/or consumption) management (“self-governance”). 
However, in the real world of limited resources, complex social interactions 
between many individuals (division, specialization and cooperation of labor, and 
intensive exchanges) and conflicting interests, there is a need for a special 
governing mechanism to direct, coordinate, stimulate, induce and enforce 
individual’s efforts to accomplish a sustainable development.  
For instance, maintaining agro-ecosystem services flows14 is an important 
part of sustainable agrarian development. Ensuring the effective supply of agro-
ecosystem services requires appropriate behavior of individuals15 and coordinated 
actions at various levels [Bachev, 2009]. According to (awareness, symmetry, 
strength, and harmonization costs of) interests of agents associated with agro-
ecosystem services (consumers, contributors, transmitters, and interest groups), 
there are different needs for governing of actions (Figure 1).  
                                                        
14
 Humans benefit from multiple resources, products and processes supplied by natural ecosystems 
known as ecosystem services including: provisioning services (food; water; pharmaceuticals, 
biochemicals, and industrial products; energy; and genetic resources), regulating services 
(carbon sequestration and climate regulation; waste decomposition and detoxification; 
purification of water and air; crop pollination; pest and disease control; and mitigation of floods 
and droughts), supporting services (soil formation; nutrient dispersal and cycling; seed 
dispersal; and primary production), generation and maintenance of biodiversity, and cultural 
services (cultural; intellectual and spiritual inspiration; recreational experiences; and scientific 
discovery) [Daily]. 
15
 “pro-environmental” actions, “anti-environmental” inactions. 
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In our example, the Farm 1 has to govern its efforts and relations with Farm 2 
since both receive services from Ecosystem 1 and affect (positively or negatively) 
the service supply of that ecosystem.  
 
 
Figure 1. Governance needs for effective supply of agro-ecosystem services. 
In addition, both farms are to govern their relations with consumers of 
services from Ecosystem 1 (agents in Social system 1) to meet the total demands 
and compensate the costs for maintaining ecosystem services to that direction. In 
addition, Farms 1 and 2 have to coordinate efforts with agents in Social system 1 
to mitigate conflicts with agents in Social system 2 (negatively affecting services 
of Ecosystem 1). Furthermore, Farm 1 is to govern its relations with Farm 3 for 
effective service supply from Ecosystem 3, and manage its interaction with 
Ecosystem 2. Moreover, Farms 1 and 3 have to govern their relations with Farms 
4 and agents from Social system 1 (consumers of services of Ecosystem 3) and 
Social system 2 (consumers and destructors of Ecosystem 3 services). Finally, 
Farm 1, adversely affecting Ecosystem 4 services, is to govern relations with 
agents in Social system 2 (consumers of Ecosystem 4 services) to reconcile 
conflicts and secure effective flow of ecosystem services. Therefore, Farm 1 is to 
be involved in seven different systems of governance in order to assure effective 
supply of services from ecosystems of which it belongs or affects.  
Similarly, for effective governance of Ecosystem 1 services, there are five 
necessary governing modes – for coordination of actions of Farms 1 and 2; agents 
in Social system 1; Farms 1 and 2 with Social system 1; agents in Social system 2; 
and Farms 1 and 2 and Social system 1 with Social system 2. 
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In order to accomplish their goals and benefit from specialization and owned 
resources, the “rational” agents (could) use diverse modes of governance – 
compete and/or cooperate with each other, and/or exchange rights and resources, 
and/or obey to an external private, collective or public order. Thus the 
achievement of the state of overall efficiency (the maximum productivity, social 
welfare, and sustainability) is driven by various social arrangements – preset 
formal and informal rules (institutional environment), competition, contracting, 
cooperation, profit-making or non-for profit activity, collective actions, pure 
private order, public order, voluntary initiatives, mixed modes, etc. Depending on 
the efficiency of the system of governance which is put in place, the outcome of 
the development is quite different with diverse levels of socio-economic 
progression (Figure 2). 
Therefore, all systems for the assessment of sustainability must not only 
include the outcome(s) of the process, that is the “current” level (the state) of 
sustainability. The evaluation is to embrace the system of governance put in 
place, the social mechanism responsible for the outcome. Otherwise, mere 
analysis of the state or trend indicators would give no adequate picture for the 
ability of the system to improve, sustain, or adapt to a new sustainable level. 
Thus, the problem for assessing the efficiency of individuals governing 
mechanisms and for selecting the most efficient one(s) is very important. The 
New Institutional and Transaction Cost Economics gives us a good framework to 
answer this key question.  
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Figure 2. Governing mechanisms for agrarian sustainability. 
2.3. THE COSTS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Transaction costs are the costs associated with the protection and the 
exchange of individuals’ rights [Furuboth and Richter]. In addition to the 
production costs, the economic agents make significant costs for the coordination 
of their relations with other agents (individuals, private entities, and public 
authorities)16. For example, farmers have costs for finding best prices and partners 
for land, inputs and labor supply, financing, and marketing of outputs and 
services; for negotiating the conditions of exchange; for completing and “writing 
down” contract or setting up a partnership organization (coalition); for 
coordination through a collective decision-making or direct managerial orders; for 
enforcing negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring and 
safeguarding; for disputing through a court system or another way; and for 
adjusting or termination along with the changing conditions of exchange.  
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 The production costs are the costs associated with the proper technology (combination of 
production factors) of certain farming, servicing, environmental, community development, etc. 
activities. The transaction costs are the costs for governing the economic and other relations 
between individuals. 
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The institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction 
costs of individual agents. For instance, when private rights are well-defined and 
protected, and (public) systems for contract enforcement work well, it facilitates 
transactions between individuals17 and the effective allocation of resources. The 
develpoment of the institutional environment also imposes significant transaction 
costs to agents – e.g. studying and complying with various institutional 
restrictions (community or state norms, regulations, standards, etc.), formal 
registration of contracts and entities, efforts to deal with bureaucracy, etc. A good 
example in this respect are the current problems of many Bulgarian farms needing 
to meet the new EU requirements (“institutionally determined” costs) related to 
new product quality, food safety, labor, environmental, animal welfare, etc. 
standards [Bachev, 2008]. Furthermore, EC is increasingly criticized for imposing 
unnecessary regulations (and related costs) for agrarian agents such as the size, 
shape and color of vegetables and fruits for trade in EU, etc. 
The transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded 
rationality and tendency for opportunism [Williamson]. The economic agents do 
not possess full information about the system (price ranges, trade opportunities, 
adverse effects of their activities on others, or trends in development) since the 
collection and the processing of such information would be either very expensive 
or impossible (e.g. for future events, for partner’s intention for cheating, time and 
space discrepancy between individual action and adverse impacts on others, etc.). 
In order to optimize decision-making (to reach the state of efficiency and 
sustainability) they have to spend costs for "increasing their imperfect rationality" 
- for data collection, analysis, forecasting, training, etc.  
The individuals are also given to opportunism, and, if there is an opportunity 
for some of the transacting sides to get non-punishably extra rent from the 
exchange (performing unwanted exchange by others), he or she will likely “steal” 
the rights of others. Two major forms of opportunism can be distinguished: pre-
contractual ("adverse selection") - when some of the partners use the "information 
asymmetry" to negotiate better contract terms—and post-contractual ("moral 
hazard") - when some counterpart takes an advantage of impossibility for full 
observation on his or her activities (by another partner or by a third party) or when 
he or she takes "legal advantages" of the unpredicted changes in transacting 
conditions (costs, prices, environment, etc.).  
A special third form of opportunism occurs in the development of large 
organizations (known as “free-riding”). Since the individual benefits are often not 
                                                        
17
 Time and efforts for completing formalities for registration of a new company and/or for contract 
enforcement through the court system are often used as indicators for assessing the “business 
climate” in a particular country (region).  
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proportional to the individual efforts, everybody tends to expect others to invest 
costs for the organizational development and later on to benefit ("free riding") 
from the successful new organization [Olson].  
Commonly, it is very costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from 
non-opportunistic behavior (because of the bounded rationality). Therefore, 
agrarian agents have to protect their transactions and rights from the hazards of 
opportunism through: ex ante efforts to protect their “absolute” (given by 
dominating institutions) rights, and find a reliable counterpart and to design an 
efficient mode for partner’s credible commitments to the “contracted” (voluntary 
transferred) rights; and ex post investments for overcoming (through monitoring, 
controlling, and stimulating cooperation) of possible opportunism during the 
contract execution stage. 
If transaction costs were zero, then the mode of the governance would not be 
of economic importance. In such a world, the individuals would manage their 
relations with an equal efficiency though free markets, private organizations of 
different types, or in a single nationwide company. All information for the 
effective potential of transactions (exploration of technological opportunities, 
satisfying various demands, and respecting assigned and transferred rights) would 
be available and costless. And the individuals would, for no cost, protect their 
(absolute and contracted) rights and trade-owned resources (and products) in 
mutual benefit until exhausting the possibilities for increasing productivity, 
maximizing the consumption, and the sustainable development18.  
However, very often the high costs make it difficult or block otherwise 
efficient (mutually beneficial) transactions. We have already mentioned the 
textbook cases of “market failure” connected with the negative and positive 
externalities. Since free-market prices do not reflect the effect on the third party’s 
welfare, they cannot govern effectively the relations between individuals. The 
maximization of the social output (welfare) is not achieved, and inefficient 
allocation of resources and activities and unsustainable development arrives. 
Hence, farmers will over-produce “public bads” (noise, air, and water pollution) 
and under-produce “public goods” (rural amenities, ecological and cultural 
services; habitat for wildlife, and biodiversity). That necessitates a “government 
intervention” to eliminate the differences between the social and the private prices 
(an “internalization of externalities” through taxes, norms, etc.).  
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 Currently, there is a principle agreement (a “social contract”) for a global sustainable 
development. 
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The problem of “social costs and efficiency” does not exist in the world of 
zero transaction costs and well-defined private rights19. However, when 
transaction costs are significant, then costless protection, negotiation and 
exchange of rights is impossible. Thus, the initial allocation of property rights 
between individuals is critical for the overall efficiency and sustainability. 
Moreover, if rights on important resources are not well-defined (e.g. rights on 
clean air and water, on intellectual agrarian properties, etc.), it creates big 
difficulties in effective allocation - e.g. unsolvable costly disputes between 
polluting farmers and neighborhoods; slow transfer and dissemination of agrarian 
innovations, etc. Consequently, some essential activities (and transactions) are not 
carried out at a socially effective scale, and the existing governing structures 
contribute less to sustainable development [Bachev, 2007].  
Thus the type of the governance becomes crucial since various modes give 
unequal possibilities for participants to coordinate activities, and stimulate an 
acceptable behavior of others (counterparts and dependents), and protect their 
contracted and absolute rights from unwanted expropriation [Williamson]. In the 
world of positive transaction costs, the rational agrarian agents will seek, choose, 
and develop such modes for governing their activities and relations with others, 
which will maximize their benefits and minimize their total (production and 
transacting) costs. In the long run only efficient modes for governing different 
activities will prevail (sustain) in agriculture [Bachev, 2004].  
The technological development also enormously affects the structure and 
level of transaction costs [North]. For instance, mechanization and standardization 
of farming operations (products) increases bounded rationality of manager, and 
diminishes possibility for opportunism of hired labor and counterparts. That leads 
to the extension of activities and transactions under a single management (the 
farm size) – enlargement of both the internal transactions (internal division and 
specialization of labor) and the outside market and/or contract transacting 
(procurement, trade, cooperation, etc.).  
Possibilities that progression and application of modern production (e.g. 
precision farming, transportation, measurement, information, communication, etc. 
technologies) gives to coordinate and intensify transactions and minimize related 
costs are immense20 - easy assessment and traceability; on-line information, 
coordination, monitoring, detecting, and advice; direct low cost exchanges 
(expressing demands, finding best prices and partners, negotiating, trading, and 
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 The situation of maximum efficiency is always achieved independent of the initial allocation of 
rights. [Coase, 1960] 
20
 The traditional approach examines technology merely as a production factor. In fact, technology 
and its development are important transaction costs minimization factors as well.  
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disputing) and collective actions (coalitions) of interested agents at national and 
international scales; rapid detection of problems and interventions by the 
governments and international agencies; full participation of individuals in and 
control on public decision-making, etc.  
However, that enormous potential for increasing productivity, effective 
allocation of resources, conservation of environment, and food security21 meets 
the restrictions of imperfect institutional arrangements which eventually slow-
down the scientific and technological progress, impede individual market and 
private transactions, allow particular agents (bureaucrats and interest groups) to 
benefit from the status-quo, and lead to unsustainable “development”. For 
instance, it is widely recognized that the constant “food crisis” has been a 
consequence not of the lack of sufficient (world) technologies and resources for 
food production, but the result of bad governance (inefficient governments, 
inefficient international organizations, and inefficient global governance). 
The (high) sustainability of agrarian structures is a necessary22, but not a 
sufficient condition for sustainable development [Bachev and Peeters]. The 
overall goals of sustainable development cannot be automatically achieved 
through totally decentralized actions (free market competition and private 
initiatives). There is a need for a special (designed and installed) governance 
which includes a significant public (community, national, transnational, and 
global) intervention in the agrarian sector. 
There is not a single (universal) mode for an effective organization of all 
types of agrarian activity in any possible natural, institutional, and economic 
surroundings [Bachev, 2004]. The individual governing forms have distinct 
features (different advantages and disadvantages) to protect rights and to 
coordinate and stimulate socially desirable activities. Besides, the agents have 
specific personal characteristics – different awareness, entrepreneurships, 
preferences, risk aversions, tendency for opportunisms, etc. Furthermore, 
efficiency of the governing mode will depend on the specific attributes of each 
activity and transaction.  
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 The list of prospective scientific and technological innovations that are shaping agrarian 
sustainability and governance has been identified at recent COST Foresight 2030 Workshops 
[COST]. 
22
 According to many, the sustainability of farms is one of the major criteria (and an indicator) for 
sustainable agrarian development [Sauvenier at al.]. In fact, the experience of beef, pig, and 
poultry sectors of developed countries shows that financial stability (security) for farmers 
increases after the transformation from  independent operators (traditional family farms) into 
hired laborers of the vertically integrated industries [Martinez; Sporleder]. 
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Therefore, the individual transaction and the transaction costs are to be put in 
the center of the analysis, and the comparative efficiency of the feasible modes for 
governing socially desirable activities assessed [Bachev, 2007].  
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 
3. IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE 
 
In rare cases there is only one practically possible form for governance of 
agrarian activity. For example, in Japanese-dispersed paddy agriculture, water 
supply could not have been conducted by individual farmers (high 
interdependency, inseparability of water use) and since the earliest period, water 
use organizations developed as public projects [Mori]. Similarly, in the dry lands 
of Israel, collection and utilization of scare rain water in farming 
(complementarities and inseparability of activity) has been done by community 
organizations for centuries now [Berkowicz]. 
Often the choice of the governing mode is pre-determined by institutional 
restrictions as some forms for carrying out farming activities, land and labor 
supply, trade of output, etc. could be socially unacceptable or illegal in certain 
countries or periods of time23. For instance, corporate and cooperative 
organization of farming is forbidden in many countries; market trade of farmland 
(natural resources) and some outputs (inputs) are illegitimate and  private 
management of national ecosystems (parks and reserve zones) is not allowed, etc.  
Generally, every agrarian activity and transaction could be governed through 
a great variety of alternative forms. For instance, a supply of environmental 
preservation service could be governed as: a voluntary activity of a farmer; 
through private contracts of the farmer with interested or affected agents; through 
an interlinked contract between the farmer and a supplier or a processor; through 
a cooperation (collective action) with other farmers and stakeholders; through a 
(free) market or assisted by a third-party (a certifying and controlling agent) trade 
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 Nevertheless, when transaction costs associated with illegitimate governance is not high 
(possibility for disclosure low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) and benefits are 
considerable, then the more effective modes prevail – large gray or black sectors of economy are 
common around the globe.  
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with special (eco, protected origins, and fair-trade) products; through a public 
contract specifying the farmer’s obligations and compensation; through a public 
order (regulation, taxation, and quota for use of recourses or emissions); within a 
hierarchical public agency; or by a hybrid form.  
The different governance modes are alternative but not equal modes for the 
organization of activities. Each of them has distinct advantages and disadvantages 
to protect rights, and coordinate and stimulate socially desirable activities.  
The free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible 
hand of market” and “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” 
opportunities to benefit from the specialization and the exchange. However, 
market governance could be associated with a high uncertainty, risk, and costs due 
to the price instability; the great possibility for facing an opportunistic behavior; 
the “missing market” situation, etc.  
The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination, 
intensification, and safeguard of transactions. However, it may require large costs 
for the specification of contract provisions, for adjustments with constant changes 
in the conditions, for enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms, etc.  
The internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility and control 
on transactions (direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute 
resolution by a fiat). However, the extension of the internal mode beyond the 
family and small-partnership boundaries (allowing achievement of the minimum 
technological or agronomic requirements and exploration of technological 
economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs for development 
(initiation and design, formal registration, and restructuring), and for current 
management (for collective decision making, control on the coalition members 
opportunism, supervision and motivation of hired labor, etc.). 
Separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation, and 
public firm/farm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and 
transacting efficiency – internal division and specialization of labor; exploration 
of economies of scale and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk 
sharing; and investing in product promotion, brand names, relations with 
customers, counterparts and authorities. However, it could be connected with 
huge transaction costs for decreasing information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders, in decision-making, in controlling opportunism, 
and in adaptation. Cooperative and non- profit form also suffer from low 
capability for internal long-term investment due to non- profit goals and non-
tradable character of shares (so called “horizon problem”). 
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In order to select the best (most efficient) form for governing a particular 
activity, we have to assess the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
practically possible forms for governance of that activity.  
In some cases the advantages of a certain mode of governance are not 
difficult to verify - e.g. when it gives bigger benefits (achieves the socially 
desirable/effective scale) or commands minimum total costs, etc. In such cases the 
choice of the most effective form of governance is easy since we can directly 
compare the costs and the benefits of alternatives. For instance, in most countries, 
much of the agrarian activity is commonly governed in some sort of family farm, 
the supply of inputs or exchange of farm outputs are governed by market modes, 
etc.  
However, in many instances, the direct assessment (the comparison) of the 
costs and the benefits of the alternative governing arrangements are difficult or 
impossible to make. That is particularly true for some elements of the transaction 
costs related to diverse governance structures24. In the latter group we can include 
the costs for finding the best partners for negotiation, for controlling and 
enforcement of contractual terms, for organizational development, for interlinked 
transacting, for unrealized (failed) deals, etc. [Bachev, 2004]. Besides, it is often 
extremely complicated to separate transaction costs from traditional production 
expenditures25. For example, while executing farming operations, a farmer 
supervises hired labor. During transportation of chemicals, he negotiates 
marketing of output, etc.  
What is more, component comparisons of transacting costs cannot always 
give an idea for efficiency of organizations. Very often the alternative form 
decreases one type of cost while increasing another type of transaction costs – 
e.g. internalization of a transaction (replacement of market with integral mode) is 
associated with reduction of costs for information supply (overcoming market 
uncertainty), permanent (re)negotiations along with constantly changing 
conditions, and safeguarding investments from outside opportunism. On the other 
hand, it enlarges costs for organizational formation, decision making, integral 
management, supervising and motivation of hired labor, etc.  
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 Data for some part of transaction costs can be found in traditional statistics, accountancy, and 
project documentation – e.g. costs for licensing and registration, agro-market information, 
promotion and marketing of output, general management, hiring lawyers and court suits, 
guarding property and yields, purchase of insurance against social hazards, payment of bribes, 
etc. 
25
 All these “measurement problems” make it impossible to extend the traditional Neoclassical 
models simply by adding a new “transacting activity” [Furuboth and Richter]. 
Improving the Governance 30 
Moreover, a good part of transactions in agriculture is governed not by “pure” 
modes, but through complex or interlinked modes - e.g. using a multipurpose 
cooperative for inputs supply and marketing for a private farm; input supply in a 
“package” with know-how, extension or/and service supply; joint supply of inputs 
and credit; crediting of production against marketing of output, etc.  
Thus, it is important to take into consideration overall (total) costs for 
organization of transactions of different types - all external and internal 
transaction costs of an organization. 
Often it is difficult to select a base for comparison in view that the high 
transaction costs entirely block development of alternative organizations. For 
instance, the market for agrarian credit did not emerge in East Europe during most 
of the transition and internal supply (utilization of own finance and direct outside 
co-investment was the only possible form for finance supply of farms) [Bachev, 
2006]. Here the comparative level of transaction costs is impossible to be 
determined and the “high” efficiency of the integral mode for finance supply 
appreciated. In that case, funding with one’s “own means” and with “bank credit” 
are not real alternatives at all, but completely different governing structures26.  
The discrete structural analysis is suggested to evaluate the comparative 
efficiency of the alternative governing forms [Williamson]. Here the assessment of 
the absolute levels of transaction costs of the alternative governing structures is 
not necessary. This approach aims to evaluate the relative levels of transaction 
costs between alternative modes of governance and selecting that one which most 
economizes  transaction costs. 
Following that framework, first we have to identify the “critical dimensions” 
of transactions responsible for the variation of transaction costs. The “frequency”, 
“uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” have been identified as critical factors of the 
transaction costs by Williamson [Williamson] while the “appropriability” has 
been added by Bachev and Labonne [Bachev and Labonne].  
When the recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, then 
both (all) sides are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations 
(avoiding opportunism, building reputation, setting up adjustment mechanisms, 
etc.). Besides, the costs for the development of a special private mode for 
facilitating bilateral (or multilateral) exchange could be effectively recovered by 
frequent exchange.  
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 Thus, broadly applied in the west, indicators for estimation of comparative efficiency of 
investments based on “opportunity costs” (discounting, payback period, and internal rate of 
return) independent from the form of funding have no significant economic sense in transitional 
conditions. 
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When the uncertainty which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for 
carrying out and securing the transactions go up (for overcoming information 
deficiency, safeguarding against risk, etc.). Certain risks could be diminished or 
eliminated by a production management or through a special market mode (e.g. 
purchasing insurance). However, the governance of most transaction risk would 
require special private forms – e.g. trade with origins; providing guarantees; using 
share-rent or output-based compensation; employing economic hostages; 
participating in a risk-pooling, inputs-supply or marketing cooperative; or a 
complete integration [Bachev and Nanseki].  
The transaction costs get very high when specific assets for the relations with 
a particular partner are to be deployed 27. The relation specific investments are 
"locked" in transactions with a particular buyer or seller, and cannot be recovered 
through a "faceless" market trade. Therefore, dependant investment (assets) have 
to be safeguarded by a special form such as long-term contracts, interlinks, 
hostage taking, joint investments, or ownership integrations.  
The transaction is particularly difficult when the appropriability of rights on 
products, services or resources is low. "Natural" low appropriability has most of 
the agrarian intellectual products - agro-market information, agro-meteorological 
forecasts, new varieties and technologies, software, etc. Besides, all products and 
activities with significant (positive or negative) externalities are to be included in 
this group. If the appropriability is low, the possibility for unwanted (market or 
private) exchange is great, and the costs for protection of private rights 
(safeguarding, detecting cheating, and disputing) is extremely high. The agents 
would either overproduce (negative externalities) or under-organize such activity 
(positive externalities) unless they are governed by an efficient private or hybrid 
mode (cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, trade secrets, or public 
order).  
Secondly, we have to “align transactions (differing in their attributes) with the 
governance structures (differing in their costs and competence) in discriminating 
(mainly in transaction cost economizing) way” [Williamson]. According to the 
combination of the specific characteristics of each transaction, there will be 
different the most effective form for governing of activity (Figure 3).  
Agrarian transactions with a good appropriability, high certainty, and 
universal character of investments (the partner can be changed anytime without 
significant additional costs) could be effectively carried across the free market 
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 Specificity is not a technological but transaction characteristic of the assets. In one situation a 
particular capital (investment) could be highly universal (easy deployment to another internal 
usage or outside trade) while in others,highly specific (a big dependency from the relations with 
a certain counterpart - buyer or seller). 
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through spotlight or classical contracts. Here the organization of transactions with 
a special form or within the farm (firm) would only bring extra costs without 
producing any transaction benefits.  
 
 
 - the most effective mode;  - a necessity for a third party involvement. 
Figure 3. Principle modes for governing of agrarian transactions28. 
The recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, and a high uncertainty 
and appropriability, could be effectively governed through a special contract. The 
relational contract is applied when detailed terms of transactions are not known at 
outset (a high uncertainty), and a framework (mutual expectations) rather than a 
specification of the obligations is practiced. The partners self-restrict from 
opportunism and are motivated to settle the emerging difficulties and continue 
relations (the situation of a frequent bilateral trade). Besides, no significant risk is 
involved since investments could be easily (freely) redeployed to another use or 
users (no assets dependency exist).  
A special contract form is also efficient for rare transactions with a low 
uncertainty, high specificity and appropriability. The dependent investment could 
be successfully safeguarded through the contract provisions since it is easy to 
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 The differences in the personal characteristics of the agents are disregarded. Only the extreme 
levels (high-low) of the critical factors of transactions are considered. In the real agrarian 
economy, there is a big variation of the critical dimensions, and thus of the effective governing 
forms (including mixed, hybrid, interlinked, etc. governance). 
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define and enforce the relevant obligations of partners in all possible 
contingencies (no uncertainty surrounds transactions). Here the occasional 
character of the transactions does not justify the internalization within the farm 
(firm).  
The transactions with a high frequency, a big uncertainty, large assets 
specificity (dependency), and a high appropriability, have to be organized within 
the farm/firm (the internal ownership mode). For instance, the managerial and the 
technological knowledge is quite specific to a farm, and its supply has to be 
always governed through a permanent labor contract and coupled with the 
ownership rights [Bachev, 2004]. The capital investments in land are to be made 
or owned (or long-leased) rather than a seasonally-rented land (high site and 
product specificity). All “critical” to the farm material assets will be internally 
organized - production of forage for animals; important machineries; water supply 
for the irrigated farming, etc. While the universal capital could be effectively 
financed by a market form (e.g. a bank credit), the highly specific investments can 
be only made through internal funding (own funds, equity sell, and  joint venture).  
According to the personality of resource owners (capability, experience, and 
preferences) and the (transacting) costs of their coalition, different type of farm 
(agro-firm) will be efficient - one-person farm, family farm, partnership, 
cooperative farm, and corporative farms [Bachev, 2004]. If the specific and 
specialized capital cannot be effectively organized within the farm (economy of 
scale and scope explored, and funding made)29, then an effective governing form 
outside farm-gates is to be used - group farming, joint ownership, interlinks, 
cooperative, or lobbying for a public intervention.  
When the strong assets (capacity, time of delivery, site, and branding) inter-
dependency with an upstream or downstream partner exists, then it is not difficult 
to govern transactions through a contract mode (strong mutual interests for 
cooperation and restriction of opportunism). For instance, effective eco-contracts 
between farmers and interested businesses (symmetrical dependency) are widely 
used in developed countries,30 leading to production methods (enhanced pasture 
management, reduce use of agrochemicals, and wetland preservation) protecting 
water from pollution. 
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 The integration of transactions would either increase the management costs (need to buy from or 
sell to a competitor) or it would be loss-making compared to the outside production costs (price) 
competition. 
30
 e.g. drinking water companies in Germany [Hagedorn], and the mineral water company Vittel in 
France [Hanson et al.]. We have also discovered such agreements between farmers and Sony 
Corporation in the Kumamoto region in  Japan. 
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However, very often farmers face a unilateral dependency and need an 
effective (ownership) organization to protect their interests. The transaction costs 
for initiation and maintenance  of such “collective organizations” is usually great 
(big number of the coalition, different interests of the members, and  opportunism 
of “free-riding” types) and it is either unsustainable or does not evolve at all. That 
creates serious problems for the efficiency (and sustainability) of individual farms 
- missing markets, monopoly or quasi-monopoly situation, impossibility to 
“induce” a public intervention, etc.  
Thirdly, we have to identify the situations of market and private sector 
failures – that is the critical point for the sustainable development. Serious 
transaction problems arise when the condition of assets specificity is combined 
with a high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability (Figure 2). Here 
the elaboration of a special governing structure for a private transacting is not 
justified, the specific investments are not made, and the activity (or restriction of 
activity) fails to occur at an effective scale ("market failure" and "contract 
failure"). Similar difficulties are also encountered for rare transaction associated 
with a high uncertainty and appropriability.  
In all these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, or public authority) 
involvement in transactions is necessary (through assistance, arbitration, and 
regulation) in order to make them more efficient or possible at all. For instance, 
when a state establishes and enforces quality and safety standards for farm inputs 
(chemicals and machinery) and products, or certifies providers of agrarian 
services, or regulates employment relations, or guarantees a minimum price for 
farmers, all that considerably facilitates and intensifies (market and private) 
transactions and increases farm sustainability. The emergence and unprecedented 
development of the organic farming and the system of fair-trade are also good 
examples in that respect. There is an increasing consumer’s demand (a price 
premium) for the organic, semi-organic and fair-trade products in developed 
countries. Nevertheless, their supply could not be met unless effective trilateral 
governance (including an independent certification and control) has been put in 
place. 
When the appropriability associated with a transaction is low, there is no pure 
market mode to protect and carry out that activity effectively. Nevertheless, 
respecting others rights (unwanted exchange avoided) or “granting” additional 
rights to others (needed transactions carried) could be governed by the “good 
will” or charity actions of individuals, NGOs, governments or international 
organizations. For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental initiatives 
(agreements) have emerged driven by the competition in the food industries, 
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farmers’ preferences for eco-production, and the responses to the public pressure 
for sound environmental management31.  
However, the environmental standards are usually “process-based”, and 
“environmental audit” is not conducted by an independent party, which does not 
guarantee a “performance outcome”. Therefore, most of these initiatives are seen 
as a tool for the external image manipulation. Recent huge food safety, animal 
safety, and eco-scandals have demonstrated that such private schemes could often 
fail (result of the high-bounded rationality and possibility for opportunism).  
In any case, the voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social 
demand, especially if they require significant costs. Some private modes could be 
employed if a high frequency (a pay-back on investment is possible) and a mutual 
assets dependency (thus an incentive to cooperate) exists32. In these instances, 
unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, close-
membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal 
organization, etc. are used.  
However, the emergence of special (private) large-member organizations for 
dealing with low appropriability (and satisfying the entire “social” demand) would 
be very slow and expensive, and they will unlikely be sustainable in the long run 
(because of the “free riding” problem). Therefore, there is a strong need for a 
third-party public (government, local authority, international assistance, etc.) 
intervention in order to make such activity possible or more effective [Bachev, 
2004].  
For example, the supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be 
governed through private contracts with the individual consumers because of the 
low appropriability, high uncertainty, and rare character of transaction (the high 
costs for negotiating, contracting, charging all potential consumers, disputing, 
etc.). At the same time, the supply of additional environmental protection and 
improvement service is very costly (in terms of production and organization costs) 
and would unlikely be carried out on a voluntary basis. Besides, the financial 
compensation (price-premium) of farmers by the willing consumers through a 
pure market mode is also ineffective due to the high information asymmetry, 
massive enforcement costs, etc. A third-party mode with a direct public 
involvement would make that transaction effective: on behalf of the consumers, 
the state agency negotiates with the individual farmers a contract for 
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 Unprecedented development of the “codes of behaviors”, eco-labeling and branding, 
environmental cooperatives, and “green alliances” are all  good examples in that respect.  
32
 For instance, inter-dependency between a dairy farm and a milk processor in a remote region 
(capacity and site dependency); or a bee keeper and a neighboring orchard farm (symmetric 
dependency between needs of flower and needs for pollination).  
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“environment conservation and improvement service”, coordinates activities of 
various agents (including a direct production management), provides public 
payments for the compensation of farmers, and controls the implementation of 
negotiated terms33.  
 
 
3.2. ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY OF FARMS 
 
A significant amount of the agrarian activities is organized by different types 
of farms and farming organizations. The New Institutional Economics gives new 
insight for understanding the role of the farm and its sustainability [Bachev and 
Peeters]. The sustainability of a farm is to characterize a farm’s ability to maintain 
(continue) over time. Since no economic organization would exist in the  long-
term if it were not efficient (otherwise it would be replaced by a more efficient 
arrangement), the problem of assessment of sustainability of farms is directly 
related to the estimation of the factors and the level of farm efficiency. 
In the traditional (Neoclassical) framework, the farm is presented as a 
“production structure” and the analyses of efficiency are restricted to the 
production costs (“factors productivity” and “optimization of technological 
factors according to marginal rule”). This approach fails to explain why (in any 
given country) for a long period of time there exists so many farms with different 
levels of “efficiency” (productivity). In Bulgaria for instance, the level of 
profitability and productivity in cooperative farms has been 5 times lower than in 
private farms. Besides, there has been one million highly sustainable subsistent 
and non-profit making farms in the country [Bachev, 2006]. 
In addition to the production costs, the modern farm is also associated with 
significant transaction costs. Therefore, the “rational” agrarian agents will seek, 
chose and/or develop the most effective (less expensive) mode for organization of 
their transactions that minimize their bounded rationality, and safeguard their 
investments and rights from the hazards of opportunism. When transaction costs 
are high, they could block otherwise effective transactions, and restrict the farm 
size far below the technologically optimal level. Very often the high costs for 
market trading (e.g. finding a credit and  marketing of output) and/or internal 
governance (e.g. deficiency of low transacting cost labor) limit the farm size to 
miniature subsistent farming or family borders [Bachev, 2004]. In other instances, 
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 Namely, public environmental contracts with individual farmers have been broadly used in EU as 
an effective form for governing the supply of environmental preservation and improvement 
services [EC]. 
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the existing effective potential to economize on market transaction costs could 
cause a vast extension of farm size through a backward, lateral or forward 
integration of transactions.  
For example, the high costs for market and contract trading after 1990 has 
turned the subsistent farming into the most effective (or only possible) form for 
organization of available agrarian assets (farmland, livestock, etc.) of more than a 
million Bulgarians (Bachev, 2006). On the other hand, the enormous costs of 
market trading have caused a domination of integrated and interlinked modes of 
transacting, and a concentration of commercial farming in a few thousand large 
agro-firms and cooperatives.  
Thus, in the world of positive transaction costs, farms and other agrarian 
organizations have a significant economic role to play. They are not only 
production but also a major governing structure – a form for organization of 
transactions and for minimization of transaction costs. Therefore, sustainability of 
different farms cannot be correctly understood and estimated without analyzing 
their comparative production and governance potential [Bachev and Peeters]. 
Generally, every farm related transaction could be governed through a great 
variety of alterative market, contract, integral, etc. forms. Each of these governing 
modes gives individuals dissimilar opportunities to coordinate, stimulate, and 
control transactions, safeguard their investments from an opportunistic 
expropriation, and profit from the specialization, cooperation and exchange.  
For instance, a one-person farm (firm) has zero internal transaction costs 
(one agent), but limited possibility for investment in specialized (and specific) 
human and material capital. The “internal” opportunities for increasing 
productivity (through investments and exploring economy of scale and size) 
increases along with the extension of the members of a coalition (group farm or 
partnership). However, the latter is also associated with an enlargement of the 
costs for making the coalition (finding complementary and reliable partners) and 
the internal costs for managing the coalition (for coordination, reducing bounded 
rationality, controlling opportunism, etc.).  
The separation of ownership from the management (cooperative or 
corporation) gives enormous opportunities for productivity growth, but it is 
connected with huge transaction costs (for decreasing information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, for decision making, for adaptation, for 
controlling opportunism of hired labor and between partners, etc.).  
The special contract form combines the potential for a greater "control" on 
transactions with the possibility to explore advantages of further specialization of 
activity. Nevertheless, it could be connected with large costs for preparing and 
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enforcement of contracts for complex occasional transactions with high unilateral 
dependency.  
A free market has a big coordination and large incentive advantages 
(“invisible hand” and “power of competition”) and provides “unlimited” 
opportunities to benefit from specialization and exchange. However, market 
governance could be associated with high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price 
instability, great possibility for facing opportunistic behavior, “missing market” 
situations,  etc.  
Protection of rights and economic exchanges results in the more profitable 
use of resources, but also requires additional costs. Farmers and other economic 
agents (resource owners, consumers) will tend to govern their activity and 
relations though the most effective forms – that which will maximize their 
benefits and minimize their costs. Therefore, the most effective form and size of 
farm will be determined through optimization of total (production and transacting) 
costs, and trade-offs between the gain in the productivity/benefits and the gain in 
transacting costs.  
Hence, a farm will be efficient (sustainable) if it manages all transactions in 
the most economical for the owner(s) way – that is the situation when there exists 
no activity which could be carried out with a net benefit [Bachev, 2004]. If a farm 
does not govern activity or transactions effectively, it will be unsustainable since 
it experiences high costs and difficulties using institutions (possibilities and 
restrictions) and carrying out activity and transactions compared to other feasible 
organizations. In that case, there will be strong incentives for exploring the 
existing potential (adapting to a sustainable state) through reduction or 
enlargement of farm size, or via reorganization or liquidation of the farm. Thus, 
either alternative farm or non-farm application of resources; or farm expansion 
through an employment of additional resources; or trade instead of internal use of 
owned land and labor; or taking over by (or merger with) another farm or 
organization34 will take place. 
Furthermore, the transacting modes and the acceptable net benefits will vary 
according to the individual’s preferences, entrepreneurship ability, risk aversion, 
opportunity costs of owned resources, etc. Depending on the personality of 
resource owners and the (transaction) costs and benefits of their coalition, 
different types of farm will be preferred - one-person farms (firms), family farms 
(firms), group farms or partnership (firms), cooperative farms, and corporative 
farms [Bachev, 2004]. Expected benefits for farmers could range from the 
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 In the most developed countries, the sustainable development has been associated with the 
disappearance of the traditional farming organization in major sectors (poultry, beef, and pig) 
which has been taken over by or integrated into related industries. 
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monetary or non-monetary income to profit to indirect revenue to pleasure of self-
employment or family enterprise to enjoyment of agricultural activities to desire 
for involvement in environment, biodiversity, or cultural heritage preservation to 
increased leisure and free time, to other non-economic benefits35.  
Moreover, in the specific institutional environment (legal framework, support 
policies, tradition, access to new technology, and level of transaction costs), 
various types of farms will have quite different effective horizontal and vertical 
boundaries.  
For instance, in transitional conditions of high market and institutional 
uncertainty and inefficient property rights and contract enforcement system, most 
of the agrarian investments happened to be in a regime of high specificity 
(dependency).  
As a result, (over)integrated modes such as low productive subsistent 
households and group farming, or large production cooperatives and agro-
companies, have been dominating in Bulgaria and East Europe [Bachev, 2006]. 
Alternatively, in more matured economies, where markets are developed and 
institutions stable, the agrarian assets are with more universal character. 
Therefore, farm borders are greatly determined by the family borders, and more 
market and mixed (contract rather than entirely integrated) forms prevail. 
In order to assess the farm’s efficiency and sustainability, we have to put the 
individual transaction in the centre of analysis, and assessed the level of 
associated costs and benefits. The major types of farm transactions are associated 
with:  
 
 know-how supply, 
 innovation supply,  
 supply of land and other natural resources,  
 labor supply,  
 inputs supply,  
 service supply,  
 finance supply,  
 insurance supply,  
 marketing of services and products. 
 
Specific forms for governing of transactions in major functional areas of 
Bulgarian farms at the current stage of development are presented in Figure 4.  
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 A “desire for preservation of the farm for future generation” has been a major reason for the 
persistence (sustainability) of a great number of part-time farms in Japan [Bachev and Petters]. 
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Figure 4. Principle governing forms for functional areas of Bulgarian farms. 
The analysis is to embrace the comparative efficiency of the organization 
(governance) of every major transaction of the farm. If significant costs 
(difficulties) of some types of transacting in relation to the feasible alternatives 
are in place, then the farm is to be considered as non-sustainable. Given the fact 
that an alternative form often diminishes one type while increasing the other kind 
of transaction costs, and the widespread application of complex modes (e.g. 
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interlinking credit supply with inputs supply and/or marketing), the overall 
(internal and external) governance costs of the farm has to be taken into account.  
Next, the farm’s potential (incentives and ability) for adaptation to the 
evolving market, institutional and natural environment through effective changes 
in the governing forms (saving on transaction costs) and the production structure 
(exploring technological possibilities for growth in productivity) is to be 
estimated. Thus, if a farm does not have a potential to stay at or adapt to new 
more sustainable level(s), it would be either liquidated or transformed into 
another type of farm.  
For instance, if a farm faces enormous difficulties meeting institutional 
opportunities and restrictions (e.g. new quality and environmental standards and 
production quotas); or it has serious problems supplying managerial capital (as it 
is in a one-person farm when an aged farmer has no successor), or supply of 
needed farmland (a big demand for non-agricultural use of land), or funding 
activities (insufficient own finance and impossibility to sell equity or buy credit), 
or marketing output (a changing demand for certain products and strong 
competition with the imported products), then it would not be sustainable despite 
the high historical or current efficiency. Currently there are numerous 
unsustainable farms in most EU countries, which can hardly adjust to the 
fundamental changes in CAP and associated and enhanced competition and new 
food safety, environmental, animal welfare, etc. standards.  
Our new approach makes it clear that sustainable development does not 
mean sustainable farms and agrarian structures [Bachev and Peeters]. The farms 
and other modes of governance evolve (modernize, adapt, transfer, and disappear) 
according to the changes in the social and natural environment. The development 
of the governance must be judged depending on the contribution of dominating 
and newly emerging forms of governance to achieving various (social, economic, 
environmental, etc.) goals of sustainable development.  
Our approach also proves inadequacy of widely used indicators for 
productivity of “production costs and resources” for the assessment of the 
efficiency (viability and sustainability) of different farming organizations. 
Actually, significant differences are to be expected in the rate of profitability on 
investments in an agro-firm (a "profit making organization") from the "pay-back" 
of expenditures and resources in a cooperative ("member oriented organization"), 
a public farm (a "non-for profit organization") or in a self-consistent farm (giving 
opportunity for productive use of otherwise "non-tradable" resources such as 
family labor, land, etc.) [Bachev, 2004].  
It is obvious that traditional, statistical accountancy and other data are little 
suitable to test and broadly apply our new approach for assessing efficiency (and 
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sustainability) of farms. Here it is necessary to get micro-economic data for the 
different transactions governed by various types of farms as well as for the costs 
and benefits associated with alternative governing structures. 
 
3.3. IMPROVING MODES OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION 
 
There is a big variety of possible forms for public intervention in the market 
and private activities. The comparative analysis is to extend to the public modes 
and include: firstly, the correspondence of the public involvement to the real 
needs of development – the identified needs for a third-party intervention from 
Figure 3.  
Secondly, it needs to include an assessment of the comparative advantages of 
the alternative modes for public involvements comprising all costs – the direct 
(tax payer, assistance agency, etc.) expenses, and the transacting costs of 
bureaucracy (for coordination, stimulation, and mismanagement), and the costs 
for individuals’ participation and usage of public modes (expenses for 
information, paper works, payments of fees, and bribes), and the costs for 
community control over and for reorganization of the bureaucracy (modernization 
and liquidation of public modes), and the (opportunity) costs of public inaction.  
And thirdly, it needs to include an estimation of the comparative efficiency of 
selected form and the other practically possible (feasible) modes of governance of 
socially desirable activity such as partnership with private sector; property rights 
modernization, etc. Accordingly, a public intervention is to be initiated only if 
there is overall net benefit - when the effects are greater than additional 
(individual and social) costs for the third-party involvement [Bachev, 2007].  
Depending on the uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for the specific 
investment of public involvement, there will be different effective forms. Figure 5 
presents an example with the public modes for effective interventions in the 
“environmental transactions”.  
Principally, the interventions with a low uncertainty and assets specificity 
would require a smaller government organization (more regulatory modes, 
improvement of the general laws and contract enforcement, etc.). When 
uncertainty and assets specificity of the transactions increases, a special contract 
mode would be necessary – e.g. employment of public contracts for provision of 
private services, public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary labor 
contract for carrying out special public programs, leasing out public assets for 
private management, etc. And when transactions are characterized with a high 
assets specificity, uncertainty and frequency, an internal mode and a bigger public 
organization would be necessary – e.g. permanent public employment contracts, 
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in-house integration of crucial assets in a specialized state agency or public 
company, etc.  
 
 
 
* The environmental transactions are associated with respecting the environmental rights 
and improving the environmental performance of individual agents. 
Figure 5. Effective modes for public intervention in environmental transactions*. 
In the beginning, the existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, 
risks, and failures) in the organization of market and private transactions have to 
be specified. The appropriate government involvement would be to create an 
environment for: decreasing the uncertainty surrounding market and private 
transactions, increasing the intensity of exchange, protecting private rights and 
investments, and making private investments less dependent, etc. For instance, the 
state establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards for farm inputs and 
products, certifies producers and users of natural resources, regulates employment 
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relations, transfers water management rights to farms associations, sets up 
minimum farm-gate prices, etc. All of that facilitates and intensifies (market and 
private) transactions and increases sustainability.  
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of transactions 
have to be considered. The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or 
badly specified private rights [Bachev, 2004]. In some cases, the most effective 
government intervention would be to introduce and enforce new private property 
rights – e.g. rights on natural, biological, and environmental resources; rights on 
issuing eco-bonds and shares; marketing and stock trading of ecosystem services 
protection; tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on intellectual agrarian 
property and origins, etc. That would be efficient when the privatization of 
resources or the introduction (and enforcement) of new rights is not associated 
with significant costs (uncertainty, recurrence, and level of specific investment are 
low). That government intervention effectively transfers the organization of 
transactions into the market and private governance, liberalizes market 
competition and induces private incentives (and investments) in certain activities 
(the relevant part in Figure 3). For instance, tradable permits (quotas) are used to 
control the overall use of certain resources or level of a particular type of 
pollution36. They give flexibility, allowing farmers to trade permits and meet their 
own requirements according to their adjustment costs and specific conditions of 
production. That form is efficient when a particular target must be met, and the 
progressive reduction is dictated through permits, while trading allows the 
compliance to be achieved at a lower cost (through a private governance). The 
latter also allows a market for environmental quality to develop37. In other 
instances, it would be efficient to put in place regulations for trade and utilization 
of resources and products – e.g. standards for labor (safety and social security), 
product quality, environmental performance, animal welfare, norms for using 
natural resources, introduction of foreign species and GM crops, (water, soil, air, 
and comfort) contamination, a ban on application of certain chemicals or 
technologies, regulations for trading ecosystem service protection38, foreign trade 
regimes, mandatory eco-training and licensing of farm operators, etc. The large 
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 E.g. manure production quotas in Holland until recently, water abstraction licenses and water 
rights trading in UK and Australia, nutrition trading schemes in some US river catchments, etc. 
37
 Permits can be taken out of market in order to raise the environmental quality above the “planned” 
(by the government) level. 
38
 One can acquire credits for sponsoring protection of carbon sequestration sources or restoration of 
ecosystem service providers. Banks for handling such credits have been established and 
conservation companies have even gone public on stock exchanges [Daily et al.]. 
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body of environmental regulations in developed countries aims are changing the 
farmer’s behavior and restricting the negative externalities39.  
It makes producers responsible for the environmental effects of their products 
or the management of a product’s uses (e.g. waste). This mode is effective when a 
general improvement of the performance is desired, but it is not possible to dictate 
what changes (in activities and technologies) are appropriate for a wide range of 
operators and environmental conditions (high uncertainty and information 
asymmetry). When the level of hazard is high, the outcome is certain and the 
control is easy, and no flexibility exists (for timing or the nature of a socially- 
required result), then the bans or strict limits are the best solution. However, the 
regulations impose uniform standards for all regardless of the costs for 
compliance (adjustment) and give no incentives to over-perform beyond a certain 
level. In other instances, using the incentives and restrictions of the tax system 
would be the most effective form for intervention. Different sorts of tax 
preferences (exceptions, breaks, and credits) are widely used to create favorable 
conditions for the development of certain (sub)sectors and regions, forms of 
agrarian organization, segment of population, or specific types of activities. The 
environmental taxation on emissions or products (inputs or outputs of production) 
is also applied to reduce the use of harmful substances.  
For instance, taxes on pesticides and fertilizers are used in Scandinavian 
countries and Austria to decrease their application and environmental damaging 
impact40.  
In Holland, levies on manure surpluses were introduced in 1998 based on 
levies for nitrogen and phosphorus surpluses above a levy free surplus per hectare. 
The system creates strong incentives to minimize the leakages (and not just uses), 
and reduces the flexibility to substitute taxable for non-taxable inputs. However, it 
is associated with significant administrative and private costs41.  
The environmental taxes impose the same conditions for all farmers using a 
particular input and give signals to take into account the “environmental costs” 
inflicted on the rest of the society.  
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 For instance, in EU there is a ban for spraying pesticides by airplane, burning after harvest, 
overhead irrigation of grassland; detailed regulations for nutrition and pest management, water 
protection against pollution by nitrates, biodiversity and landscape management, licensing for 
water use, etc. Each country develops a system of “good farming practices” to set up specific 
codes for sustainable farming. 
40
 In Sweden, tax is imposed on manufacturers and importers at a fixed rate for active ingredients, 
and represents 20% of the fertilizer’s prices. In Denmark, a different rate of sales tax is applied 
on retail prices of chemicals representing an average of 37% of the wholesale prices [ECOTEC]. 
41
 Annual revenue of 7.3 million Euro versus the administration costs of 24.2 million and compliance 
expenses at farm levels between 220-580 per farms [ECOTEC]. 
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Taxing is effective when there is a close link between the activity and the 
environmental impact, and when there is no immediate need to control the 
pollution or to meet the targets for reduction. Tax revenue is also perceived to be 
important to maintain budget and activities of special (e.g. environmental) 
programs.  
However, an appropriate level of the charge is required to stimulate a 
desirable change in farmer’s behavior42. Furthermore, the nitrogen emission can 
vary according to the conditions when nitrates are applied, and attempting to 
reflect this in taxes, may result in complexity and high administrating costs. 
Besides, the distribution impact of such taxes must be socially acceptable, and the 
implications for international competitiveness also taken into account.  
In some cases, public assistance and support to private organizations is the 
best mode for intervention. Large agrarian and rural support and development 
programs have been widely used in all industrialized countries. They allow for a 
“proportional” development of agriculture, improvement of the farmer’s welfare 
(“income parity”), and, in some instances, undesired effects such as over-
intensification, environmental degradation, and market distortions43.  
The public financial support for the environmental actions is the most 
commonly used instrument for improving the environmental performance of 
farmers in the EU and other developed countries44. It is easy to find a justification 
for the public payments as a compensation for the provision of an “environmental 
service” by farmers. All studies show that value placed upon landscape greatly 
exceeds the costs of running the schemes.  
However, the share of farms covered by various agri-environmental support 
schemes is not significant45. That is a result of the voluntary (self-selection) 
character of this mode which does not attract farmers with the highest 
environment enhancement costs (most intensive and damaging environment 
producers). In some cases, the low-rate of farmers’ compliance with the 
environmental contracts is a serious problem46. The latter cannot be solved by 
augmented administrative control (enormous enforcement costs) or introducing a 
bigger penalty (politically and juridical intolerable measure). A disadvantage of 
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 In Scandinavia, the introduction of such tax brought about a reduced use of pesticide. In contrast, 
doubling the tax rate in California had no discernable effect on sales [ECOTEC]. 
43
 Namely, these negative effects led to the fundamental reform of EU CAP in recent years. 
44
 In EU, USA, and Japan the public environmental contracts are mostly with the individual farmers 
while Canada, Australia, and New Zealand direct support to community (collective) actions. 
45
 It is 25% of the Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) in old EU members [EC]. 
46
 A study in France shows that 40% of the farmers face some difficulties to enforce contracts in their 
parts of the environmental impact [Dupraz et al.].  
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“the payment system” is that once introduced, it is practically impossible 
(“politically unacceptable”) to be stopped when goals are achieved or there are 
funding difficulties. Moreover, a withdrawal of the subsidies may lead to further 
environmental harm since it would induce the adverse actions such as 
intensification and return to conventional farming.  
The main critics of the subsidies are associated with their “distortion effect”, 
the negative impact on “entry-exit decisions” from polluting industry, the unfair 
advantages to certain sectors in the country or industries in other countries, not 
considering the total costs (transportation and environmental costs, and the 
“displacement effect” in other countries). It is estimated that the agri-
environmental payments are efficient in maintaining the current level of 
environmental capital, but are less successful in enhancing the environmental 
quality [EC].  
Often, providing public information, recommendations, training and 
education to farmers, other agrarian and rural agents, and consumers is the most 
efficient form. In some cases, a pure public organization (in-house production or 
public provision) will be the most effective as in the case of important agro-
ecosystems47 and national parks; agrarian research, education and extension; agro-
meteorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary control, etc. 
Usually, the specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other 
modes of public intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (a 
governance mix) is caused by: the complementarities (joint effect) of the 
individual forms; the restricted potential of some less expensive forms to achieve 
a certain (but not the entire) level of the socially preferred outcome; the possibility 
to get an extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for participation in 
public support programs); the particularity of the problems to be tackled; the 
specific critical dimensions of the governed activity; the uncertainty (little 
knowledge and experience) associated with the likely impact of the new forms; 
the practical capability of government to organize (administrative potential to 
control and implement) and fund (direct budget resources and/or international 
assistance) different modes; and, not least importantly, the dominating (right and 
left) policy doctrine [Bachev, 2007].  
Besides, the level of an effective public intervention (governance) depends on 
the kind of the problem and the scale of intervention. There are public 
involvements which are to be executed at local (ecosystem, community, and 
regional) levels, while others require nationwide governance. And finally, there 
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 For instance, in Japan, special (so-called “third sector”) public organizations at local level take 
care of farmland in unpopulated regions. 
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are activities, which are to be initiated and coordinated at international (regional, 
European, and worldwide) levels due to the strong necessity for trans-border 
actions (needs for a cooperation in natural resources and environment 
management, for exploration of economies of scale/scale, for prevention of 
ecosystem disturbances, and for governing of spill-overs) 48 or consistent (national 
and local) government failures. Very frequently the effective governance of many 
problems (risks) requires multilevel governance with a system of combined 
actions at various levels involving a diverse range of actors and geographical 
scales. 
The public (regulatory, inspecting, provision, etc.) modes must have built 
special mechanisms for increasing the competency (decrease bounded rationality 
and powerlessness) of the bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at 
large, as well as restricting the possible opportunism (opportunity for cheating, 
interlinking, abuse of power, and corruption) of the public officers and other 
stakeholders. That could be made by training, introducing new assessment and 
communication technologies, increasing transparency (e.g. independent 
assessment and audit), and involving experts, beneficiaries, and interests groups in 
the management of public modes at all levels [Bachev, 2007]. Furthermore, 
applying “market like” mechanisms (competition and auctions) in the public 
projects design, selection and implementation would significantly increase the 
incentives and decrease the overall costs.  
Principally, a pure public organization should be used as a last resort when all 
other modes do not work effectively [Williamson]. The “in-house” public 
organization has higher (direct and indirect) costs for setting up, running, 
controlling, reorganization, and liquidation. What is more, unlike the market and 
private forms there is not an automatic mechanism (such as competition) for 
sorting out the less effective modes49. Here a public “decision making” is 
required which is associated with high costs and time, and it is often influenced by 
the strong private interests (the power of lobbying groups, policy makers and their 
associates, and employed bureaucrats) rather than the efficiency. Along with the 
development of general institutional environment (“The Rule of Law”) and the 
measurement, communication, etc. technologies, the efficiency of pro-market 
modes (regulation, information, and recommendation) and contract forms would 
get bigger advantages over the internal, less flexible public arrangements [Bachev, 
2007].  
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 A recent epidemic of avian infection is a good example in that respect. 
49
 It is not rare to see highly inefficient, but still “sustainable“ public organizations around the world. 
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Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnerships) are much more efficient 
than the pure public forms given the coordination, incentives, and control 
advantages. In the majority of cases, the involvement of farmers, farmers’ 
organizations and other beneficiaries increases efficiency - decreases asymmetry 
of information, restricts opportunisms, increases incentives for private costs-
sharing, reduces management costs, etc. [Bachev, 2007]. 
For instance, a hybrid mode would be appropriate for carrying out the supply 
of non-food services by farmers such as the preservation and improvement of 
environment, biodiversity, landscape, historical and cultural heritages.50 That is 
determined by the farmer’s information superiority, the strong interlinks of that 
activity with the traditional food production (economy of scope), the high assets 
specificity to the farm (farmer’s competence, high cite-specificity of investments 
to the farm and land), and the spatial interdependency (needs for cooperation of 
farmers at a regional or wider scale), and, not less importantly, – the farm’s origin 
of negative externalities. Furthermore, the enforcement of most labor, animal 
welfare, biodiversity, etc. standards is often very difficult or impossible at all. In 
all these cases, stimulating and supporting (assisting, training, and funding) the 
private voluntary actions are much more effective then the mandatory public 
modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing costs 
[Bachev, 2004].  
Anyway, if there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement, but an 
effective government intervention is not introduced in a due time, the agrarian 
“development” would be substantially deformed. Thus, the government failure is 
also possible and often prevails. In Bulgaria for instance, there has been a great 
number of bad examples for government under- and over-interventions in agrarian 
sectors during post-communist transition at this time [Bachev, 2006]. 
Consequently, primitive and uncompetitive small-scale farming; predominance of 
over-integrated and personalized exchanges; ineffective and corrupted agrarian 
bureaucracy; blocking out all class of agrarian transactions (innovation and 
extension supply, long-term credit supply, and supply of infrastructure and 
environmental goods); and development of a large informal (gray) sector, all have 
come out as a result. 
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 Environmental cooperatives are very successful in EU countries like Holland and Finland 
[Hagedorn]. 
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3.4. STAGES FOR ANALYSES AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The analysis and improvement of the governance of agrarian sustainability 
have to go though the following major steps: 
Firstly, an assessment needs to be made on the economic, social, 
environmental, etc. sustainability of different agricultural systems (parcel51, farm, 
eco-system, regional, national, etc.), and the existing and emerging problems and 
risks are to be identified (Figure 6). There are a great number of developed and 
practically used holistic systems for assessing the sustainability level of diverse 
agricultural systems [Sauvenier et al.; OECD, 2008; VanLoon].  
 
 
Figure 6. Steps in analysis and improvement of governance of agrarian sustainability. 
The identified problems of sustainability could be internal for a particular 
agricultural system or caused by other or larger systems52. In any case, a 
persistence of serious environmental, social and economic challenges (problems, 
conflicts, risks) is a credible indicator that an effective system of governance is 
not put in place53. Modern science increasingly offers quite precise methods both 
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 Commonly, the parcel is defined as the smallest (the lowest level) agricultural system [Sauvenier 
et al.; VanLoon]. However, the parcel management is an integral part of the farm governance. 
That is why detected sustainability problems at parcel level could only be tackled with farm 
and/or higher levels of governance. 
52
 In a globalized economy, many of the factors adversely affecting agrarian sustainability are 
external for agriculture - global warming, global financial and economic crisis, regional water 
crisis, etc. 
53
 It shows that needed social, economic, environmental preservation, etc. activity is not carried at  an 
effective (socially desirable) scale.  
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to detect various (ecological, social, etc.) problems and risks associated with the 
agriculture as well as to improve farming systems in order to mitigate 
environmental and other hazards caused by agriculture and other (man-made or 
natural) factors.  
Secondly, the spectrum of existing and other practically possible modes of 
governance (institutions and market, private, public and hybrid forms) employed 
in agriculture have to be identified, and their efficiency and sustainability 
assessed.  
The evaluation of efficiency of individual modes will show their ability 
(potential) to deal with various challenges of and contribute to agrarian 
sustainability at different levels. In addition, the assessment of sustainability of an 
existing governing structure is necessary to get an idea about its “internal” 
potential to adapt (evolve, modernize, and transform) to dynamic economic, 
institutional and natural environment, and meet effectively the new (future) 
challenges and goals of sustainable development54. All these would let us know 
whether (and the extent to which) there will be an efficient response to the 
sustainability objectives and challenges within the existing system of governance. 
Thirdly, the serious deficiencies (failures) in dominating market, private, and 
public modes to solve existing and emerging problems (risks and goals) of 
agrarian sustainability are to be specified, and the needs for a (new) public 
intervention identified. That step is to include an analysis of the structure and 
factors of transaction costs at a nationwide (social) scale, which eventually slows 
down the sustainable growth of agrarian sectors and different regions, and leads to 
an insufficient and unsustainable use of resources, underinvestment and low 
productivity in production, lack of innovations, holdup of social cohesion of 
agrarian and rural actors, etc. 
Finally, the alternative modes for public intervention to correct the existing 
market, private sector and public sector failures have to be identified (e.g. 
assistance, regulation, property rights modernization, etc.); and their comparative 
efficiency assessed in terms of contribution to sustainability and minimization of 
total social costs, and the most efficient one(s) selected.  
It is essential to assess the comparative efficiency of practically (technically 
and socially) possible and alternative forms of governance. Thus, the additional 
benefits (problems to be solved, risks to be overcome, and new goals to be 
achieved), the costs, and the modes for a new public intervention must be socially 
admissible (acceptable). If different forms permit achieving the same goals, 
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 Often some governing modes are highly efficient in “current” economic, social and natural 
environments, but unable to adapt (sustain) to evolving new (future) challenges of sustainable 
development. 
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tackling the same problems, overcoming the same risks, etc., the analysis is to 
focus on the selection of the mode minimizing the total (implementing and 
transaction) costs.  
Moreover, a form having the same (or less) costs as the alternatives is to be 
chosen if it provides more benefits or it is (socially, politically, or technically) 
more preferable than other arrangements. If one of the possible forms provides 
more benefits at the expense of more costs, then the selection is to be made 
depending on whether the additional costs for that public intervention are socially 
acceptable (and feasible) or not. Similarly, if there is a single (only one) mode 
available for governing a particular intervention (achieving a certain sustainability 
goal), it would be introduced only if associated implementing and transaction 
costs are socially admissible (and feasible). 
At this final stage, our comparative analysis has let us improve the design of 
the new forms of public intervention according to the specific market, institutional 
and natural environment of a particular country, region, and sub-sector55, and in 
terms of perfection of the coordination, adaptation, information, stimulation, 
restriction of opportunism, and controlling (in short – minimization of transaction 
costs) of participating actors (decision-makers, implementers, beneficiaries, and 
other stakeholders).  
What is more, it is also enables us to predict likely cases of new public (local, 
national, and international) failures due to the impossibility to mobilize sufficient 
political support and necessary resources and/or ineffective implementation of 
otherwise “good” policies in the specific economic and institutional environment 
of a particular country, region, sub-sector, etc. Since the public failure is a feasible 
option, its timely detection permits foreseeing the persistence or rising of certain 
problems of agrarian sustainability, and informing the (local and international) 
communities about associated risks56.  
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 The effective institutions cannot be “imported,” but must be designed for the specific conditions of 
different countries, regions, sectors, etc. [North]. 
56
 For instance, most countries have declared a “green recovery strategy” for overcoming the current 
financial and economic crises. However, only a few of them actually take the appropriate 
measures and put needed resources in that direction. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
1. ECO-GOVERNANCE DURING TRANSITION 
AND EU INTEGRATION 
 
1.1. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
There has been a fundamental post-communist transformation of Bulgarian 
agriculture since 1989 [Bachev, 2006]. New private rights on major natural 
resources (farmland, forestry, water, origins, etc.) has been introduced or restored, 
markets and trade liberalized, and modern public support and regulations 
introduced.  
During most of the transition, diverse environmental rights (on clean and 
aesthetic nature, preservation of natural resources, biodiversity, etc.) were not 
defined or were badly defined and enforced [Bachev, 2008]. Furthermore, 
inefficient public enforcement of laws and absolute and contracted rights have 
been common during the transition now57. Besides, out-dated systems of public 
regulations and control dominated until recently, which corresponded little to the 
contemporary needs of environmental management. Besides, there was no modern 
system for monitoring the state of soil, water, and air quality, and credible 
information on the extent of environmental degradation was not available.  
What is more, there existed neither social awareness of the “concept” of 
sustainable development nor any “need” to be included in public policy and/or 
private and community agenda. The lack of culture and knowledge of 
sustainability has also impeded the evolution of voluntary measures, and private 
and collective actions (institutions) for effective environmental governance. 
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 Requirements for fighting against corruption and reforming the administration and juridical 
systems have been underlined by the European Commission (EC) Monitoring Reports and 
closely scrutinized after EU accession. 
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In the last few years before the EU accession, the country’s laws and 
standards were harmonized with the immense EU legislation58. The Community 
Acquis introduced a modern framework for the environmental governance 
including new rights (restrictions) on the protection and improvement of the 
environment, preservation of traditional varieties and breeds, biodiversity, animal 
welfare, etc.  
However, a good part of these new “rules of the game” are not well-known or 
clearly understood by the various public authorities, private organizations and 
individuals [Bachev, 2008]. Generally, there is not enough readiness for an 
effective implementation of the new public order because of the lack of 
experience in agents, adequate administrative capacity, and/or practical possibility 
for enforcement of novel norms (lack of comprehension, deficient court system, 
widespread corruption, etc.).  
In many instances, the enforcement of environmental standards is difficult 
(practically impossible) since the costs for detection and penalizing of offenders 
are very high, or there is no direct links between the performance and the 
environmental impact. For example, although the burning of (stubble) fields has 
been banned for many years (2000 Law for Agricultural Land Protection), this 
environmentally harmful practice is still widespread in the country. Subsequently, 
a permanent deterioration of the  quality59, wasting of the accumulated soil energy 
through photosynthesis, an extermination of soil micro flora and other habitats, a 
significant contribution to green-house emissions60, multiplying instances of 
forests fires, and a diminished visibility and increase in traffic accidents all come 
as a result [EEA].  
The harmonization with the EU legislation and the emergence of 
environmental organizations also generates new conflicts between private, 
collective and public interests. However, the results of the public choices have not 
always been for the advantage of the effective environmental management. For 
instance, the strong lobbying efforts and profit-making interests of particular 
individuals and groups have led to a 20% reduction in numbers and a 50% 
reduction in the area of initially identified sites for the pan-European network for 
preservation of wild flora, fauna and birds NATURA 2000.  
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 The Acquis Communitaire adapted before EU accession (January 1, 2007) contains 26,000 pieces 
of legislation accounting for 80,000 pages. 
59
 Losses reach up to 80% of the organic carbon and nitrogen, and up to 50% of the remaining main 
nutrition elements in the soil [EEA]. 
60
 According to estimates, they account for 5,793 tons of methane, 1,883 tons of carbon oxide, 
4,344,879 tons of carbon dioxide, and 3,621 tons of nitrogen oxide in 2006 [EEA]. 
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1.2. PRIVATE MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
 
During much of the transition, newly evolving market and private structures 
have not been efficient in dealing with various environmental issues.  
The privatization of agricultural land and other non-land assets of ancient 
public farms took almost 10 years to complete61. During a good part of that 
period, the governance of a critical agrarian resource (farmland) was in ineffective 
and “temporary” structures such as privatization boards, liquidation councils, land 
commissions, etc. Sales and long-term lease markets for farmland did not emerge 
until 2000, and leasing on an annual base was a major form for the extension of 
farm size until recently. That was combined with a high economic and 
institutional uncertainty, and a big inter-dependency of agrarian assets [Bachev, 
2006].  
Consequently, most of the farming activities have been carried out in less 
efficient and unsustainable structures such as part-time and subsistence farms, 
production cooperatives, and huge business farms based on provisional lease-in 
contracts (Table 1). Furthermore, market adjustments and intensifying 
competition have been associated with a significant decrease in the number of 
unregistered farms (74%) and cooperatives (51%) since 1995.  
Post-communist transformation has also seen a significant change in the 
governance of livestock activity. The specialized livestock farms comprise a tiny 
portion of all farms (Table 2), while 97% of the livestock holdings are miniature 
“unprofessional farms,” breading 96% of the goats, 86% of the sheep, 78% of the 
cattle, and 60% of the pigs in the country [MAF]. Dominating modes for carrying 
out farming activities have had little incentives for long-term investment to 
enhance productivity and environmental performance [Bachev, 2006]. The 
cooperative’s big membership makes individual and collective control on 
management very difficult (costly). That focuses managerial efforts on current 
indicators, and gives a great possibility for using co-ops in the best private 
(manager’s) interests. Besides, there are differences in the investment preferences 
of diverse co-ops’ members due to the non-tradable nature of the cooperative 
shares (“horizon problem”). Given the fact that most members are small 
shareholders, older in age, and non-permanent employees, the incentives for long-
term investment for land improvement, and renovation of material and biological 
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 During the Communist period, farming was carried in few large public farms (agro-industrial 
complexes, state and collective farms), averaging tens of thousands of hectares and livestock 
heads. Besides, there were more than 1.5 million small “personal plots” (farms).  
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assets have been very low. Last but not least important, the “member-oriented” 
(not-for-profit) nature of the cooperatives prevents them from adapting to 
diversified needs of members and market demand and competition. On the other 
hand, small-scale and subsistent farms62 possess an insignificant internal capacity 
for investment and small potential to explore economy of scale and scope (big 
fragmentation and inadequate scale). Besides, they have little incentives for non-
productive (environment conservation, animal welfare, etc.) investment.  
 
Table 1. Number, size and importance of different types of farms in Bulgaria 
 
 Public 
farms 
Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-
firms 
Total 
Number of farms      
1989 2,101 1,600,000 na na 1,602,101 
1995 1,002 1,772,000 2,623 2,200 1,777,000 
2000 232 755,300 3,125 2,275 760,700 
2005  515,300 1,525 3,704 520,529 
2007  458,617 1,281 5,186 465,084 
Share in number 
(%) 
     
1989 0.13 99.9   100 
1995  99.7 0.1 0.1 100 
2000  99.3 0.4 0.3 100 
2005  99.0 0.3 0.7 100 
2007  98.6 0.3 1.1 100 
Share in farmland 
(%) 
     
1989 89.9 10.1   100 
1995 7.2 43.1 37.8 11.9 100 
2000 1.7 19.4 60.6 18.4 100 
2005  33.5 32.6 33.8 100 
2007  32.2 24.7 43.1 100 
Average size (ha)      
1989 2,423.1 0.4   3.6 
1995 338.3 1.3 800 300 2.8 
2000 357.7 0.9 709.9 296.7 4.7 
2005  1.8 584.1 249.4 5.2 
2007  2.2 613.3 364.4 6.8 
Source: National Statistical Institute and Ministry of Agriculture and Food. 
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 Subsistence and semi-market farms comprise the best part of the farms as almost 1 million 
Bulgarians are involved in farming mostly on a part-time base and for “supplementary” income 
[MAF]. 
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Table 2. Number and size of livestock holdings in Bulgaria (November 2007) 
 
Type of       Share 
       
      Share 
     
     Share 
          
      Share Average 
holdings farms heads farms heads farms heads farms heads heads 
        1-2        3-9     10-19     20 and >  
Dairy 
cows 79.8 36.1 16 25.2 2.5 11.8 1.6 26.8 2.7 
Buffalo 
cows 69.9 19 17.7 13 7.2 15.5 5.2 52.5 5.1 
       1-9     10-49    50 -99      100 and >  
Ewes 85 37.1 12 24.5 2 15 1 23.4 8.6 
She-goats 97.1 75.3 2.7 17.4 0.2 4.1 0.1 3.2 2.8 
        1-2        3-9    10-199      200 and >  
Breeding 
pigs 78.8 12.8 14.9 8.8 5.8 21.1 0.5 57.4 7.8 
Source: MAF Agro-statistics. 
 
Moreover, there has been no state administrative capacity, nor a political will 
to enforce the quality and eco-standards in that vast informal sector of the 
economy. 
Likewise, the larger business farms operate mainly on leased land and 
concentrate on high pay-off investment with a short pay-back period (e.g. cereals 
and sunflowers). That has been coupled with ineffective outside pressure (by 
authority and the community) for respecting the official standards for ecology, 
land use (crop rotation and nutrition compensation), biodiversity, etc. In general, 
survivor tactics and behavior, rather than a long-term strategy toward farm 
sustainability, has been common among the commercial farms. 
Furthermore, during the entire transition, the agrarian long-term credit market 
was practically blocked due to the big institutional and market uncertainty, and 
the high specificity of much of the farm investments [Bachev and Kagatsume]. In 
addition, newly evolving Bulgarian farming has been left as one of the least 
supported in Europe63. Until 2000, the public aid was mainly in the form of 
preferential short-term credit for the grain producers and insignificant support to 
capital investments. That policy additionally contributed to the destructive impact 
                                                        
63
 Estimates demonstrate that the aggregate level of support to agriculture before 2000 was very 
low—close to zero or even negative [OECD, 2000]. 
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for unbalanced unilateral N fertilization by the biggest producers having access to 
the programs.  
Despite the considerable progress in the public support since 2000 (EU 
Special Assistance Program for Agriculture and Rural Development – SAPARD 
and CAP measures), the overall support to agriculture is estimated very little 
[Bachev and Kagatsume]. In addition, only a small proportion of the farms 
benefits from some form of public assistance—most of these farms being large 
enterprises from regions with less socio-economic and environmental problems. 
Basically, a publicly-supported farm must meet the requirements for good 
environmental performance. However, the minor amount of actually supported 
farms, he deficiency of clear criteria for eco-performance, and the lack of 
effective control have barely contributed to the overall improvement of the  
environmental situation.  
Hence, since 1990, the entire “environmental management” has been left on 
the farmer’s “good will” and the “market signals”. Market governance 
(competition and marginal rule) has led to a sharp decline in all crop (except 
sunflower) and livestock (except goat) productions64. The smaller size and owner 
operating nature of the majority of farms avoided certain problems of the large 
public enterprises from the past such as lost natural landscape, biodiversity, nitrate 
and pesticide contamination, huge manure concentration, uncontrolled erosion, 
etc. Subsistent and small-scale farming has also revived some traditional (and 
more sustainable) technologies, varieties and products.  
In addition, the private mode has introduced incentives and possibilities for an 
integral environmental management (including revival of eco- and cultural 
heritage, anti-pollution, esthetic, comfort, etc. measures) profiting from the inter-
dependent activities such as farming, fishing, agro-tourism and recreation, 
processing, trade, etc. Last but not least, there are good examples for foreign 
direct investment in cereals, oil crops, and integrated with farming vine and food 
processing, which introduce modern (western) governance, technologies, quality, 
labor and environmental standards. 
A by-product of dominating “market and private governance” is a 
considerable de-intensification of the agriculture, and an ease of the general 
environmental pressure and pollution compared to the pre-reform level. For 
instance, the total amount of used chemical fertilizers and pesticides has declined 
considerably, and now their per hectare application represents merely 22% and 
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 For potatoes by 33%, wheat 50%, corn and burley 60%, tomatoes, Alfalfa hay and table grape 
75%, apples 94%, pig meat 82%, cattle meat 77%, sheep and goat meat 72%, poultry meat 51%, 
cow milk 45%, sheep milk 66%, buffalo milk 59%, wool 85%, eggs 45%, and honey 57% 
[NSI]. 
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31% of the 1989 level (Figure 7). That sharp reduction in chemical use has 
drastically diminished the risk of the chemical contamination of soils, waters, and 
farm produce. Consequently, a good part of the farm production has received 
unintended “organic” character obtaining a good reputation for products with a 
high quality and safety.  
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1989 1991 1994 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
pe
rc
en
t
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800 N compensation (%)
P compensation (%)
K compensation (%)
Irrigated area (000
ha) 
Pesticides (00 t)
Fertilizers (000 t)
 
Source: National Statistical Institute and Ministry of Agriculture and Food. 
Figure 7. Irrigation, chemical application, and  rate of fertilizer compensation in Bulgarian 
agriculture.  
Nonetheless, a negative rate of fertilizer compensation of N, P and K intakes 
dominate being particularly low for phosphorus and potassium (Figure 7). 
Accordingly, an average of 23595,4 t N, 61033,3 t P205 and 184392 t K20 have 
been irreversibly removed annually from soils since 1990 [MAF]. Furthermore, an 
unbalance of nutrient components has been typical with application of 5.3 times 
less phosphorus and 6.7 times less potassium with the appropriate rate for the 
nitrogen used during that period. Moreover, a monoculture or simple rotation has 
been constantly practiced by most large operators concentrating on few profitable 
crops (such as sunflower and wheat). All these practices further contributed to 
deterioration of soil quality and soil organic matter content.  
There has also been a considerable increase in agricultural land affected by 
acidification (Figure 8). It has been a result of a long-term application of specific 
nitrate fertilizers65 and unbalanced fertilizer applications without adequate input 
of phosphorus and potassium. Currently, almost a quarter of soils are acidified as 
a percentage of degraded farmland acidified soils reach 4.5% of total lands. After 
1994, the percentage of acidified soil began to decrease; however, in recent years 
there is a reverse tendency along with the gradual augmentation of the use of 
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 Consisting mostly of ammonium nitrate (70-80%) and carbamide (20-30%) [EEA]. 
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nitrates. During the entire period, no effective measures have been taken to 
normalize soil acidity and salinity66. 
 
 
Source: Executive Environment Agency. 
Figure 8. Share of de-gradated agricultural lands in Bulgaria. 
Erosion has been another major factor for land degradation since 1990 
(Figure 8). Due to ineffective management, around one-third of the arable lands 
are subjected to wind erosion and 70% to water erosion as total losses vary from 
0.2 to 40 t/ha in different years67. The progressing level of erosion is a result of 
the extreme weather, but it has been also adversely affected by dominant agro-
techniques, deficiency of anti-erosion measures, and uncontrolled deforestation 
[EEA]. 
There has been also a sharp reduction of irrigated farmland as merely 2-5% of 
the existing irrigation network68 has been practically used (Figure 7). 
Consequently, the irrigation impact on erosion and salinization has been 
significantly diminished. However, the decline in irrigation has had a direct 
negative effect on crop yields and the structure of crop rotation. In addition, 
irrigation has not been effectively used to counterbalance the adverse effect of 
global warming on farming (extension of farm season, increased water 
requirements, and rainfalls) and the further degradation of agricultural land.  
There has been a significant reduction of overall green-house gas (GHG) 
emissions from agriculture as well (Figure 9). Moreover, the decline in the 
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 For instance, limed acidificated lands comprises far below 2 % of the areas limed until 1990. And 
no chemical melioration or drainage of salinified land has been effectively implemented [MAF]. 
67
 Annual losses of earth masses from water erosion are estimated at 136 Mt, while wind erosion 
deflates between 30-60 Mt. Two-third of the former and almost all of the latter come from the 
arable land [EEA]. 
68
 Since 1990, a considerable physical distortion of irrigation facilities has also taken place, affecting 
80% of the internal canals [MAF]. 
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sector's contribution has been higher than the national. The N2O emissions 
comprise 59% of the total emissions from agriculture and there is a slight 
enlargement of the share in the last 5 years.  
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Source: Vassilev et al. 
Figure 9. Trend and components of green-house gas emissions from Bulgarian agriculture. 
Besides, agriculture has been a major ammonia source accounting for two-
thirds of the national emission. After 2000, the majority of NO2 emissions come 
from agricultural soils (87%) and manure management and burning of stubble 
fields (13%). The methane emission from agriculture represents about a quarter of 
the national. After 2000, the biggest portion of CH4 comes from fermentation 
from domestic livestock (72%) and manure management (24%).  
The new private management has led to an improved environmental 
stewardship on owned resources, but has not extended to nature in general (low 
appropriability of rights). It has been often associated with less concern to the 
manure and garbage management, over-exploitation of leased and common 
resources, and contamination of air and groundwater. For instance, the illegal 
garbage yards in rural areas have noticeably increased69. Farms contribute 
extensively to waste “production” with both organic and industrial materials, 
leading not only to negative changes in the beauty of scenery, but also bringing 
about air, soil and water pollution. Pollution of soil and water from industrial 
activities, waste management, and improper farming activities still presents risk 
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 The official figure for major illegal garbage locations is 4,000 [EEA]. The actual figure is far 
bigger than the official one. 
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for the environment and human health70. Data shows that in 7% of the tested soils, 
concentration of pollutants is higher than the contamination critical limits [EEA]. 
Furthermore, around a quarter of the river length does not meet the normal 
standards for good water quality [MAF]. Monitoring of water for irrigation shows 
that in 45% of water samples, the nitrates concentration exceeds the 
contamination limit value by 2 to 20 folds [MAF]. Nitrates have also been the 
most common polluter of underground water for the last 5 years71 with a slight 
excess over the ecological limit [EEA]. In addition, general levels of pollutants 
exceeding the ecological limit value for triasine pesticides in underground water, 
which is a consequence of the increased use of these chemicals, have been 
reported. 
The lack of effective manure storage capacities and sewer systems in the 
majority of farms contributes significantly to the persistence of the problem. A 
major part of the post-communist livestock activity is carried out by a great 
number of small and primitive holdings often located within village and town 
borders. Merely 0.1% of the livestock farms possess safe manure-pile sites; 
around 81% of them use primitive dunghills, and 116 thousand holdings have no 
facilities at all [MAF]. All of that contributes significantly to the pollution of air, 
water and soils, and disturbs the population’s comfort (unpleasant noise and odor, 
dirty roads, etc.).  
There have also been significant degrading impacts of agriculture on 
biodiversity. According to the official data, all 37 typical animal breeds have been 
endangered during the last several decades72 as 6 among them are irreversibly 
extinct, 12 are almost extinct, 16 are endangered and 3 are potentially endangered 
[MEW].  
Since 1990, a considerable portion of agricultural lands has been left 
uncultivated for a long period of time or entirely abandoned73. The latter has 
caused uncontrolled “development” of species, allowing development of some of 
them and suppressing others. Besides, some of the most valuable ecosystems 
(such as permanent natural and semi-natural grassland) have been severely 
                                                        
70
 Areas of agricultural land industrially polluted by heavy metals have fallen after 1990; they are not 
significant, and only about 30% of the affected soils need special monitoring [EEA].  
71
 Nitrate Vulnerable Zones cover 60% of the country’s territory and less than 7% of agricultural land 
use. 
72
 The policy toward intensification and introduction of foreign varieties and breeds during the 
Communist period and the lack of any policy toward protection of biodiversity afterwards have 
largely contributed to the degradation of the rich diversity of local plants and animal breeds.  
73
 Currently, almost 10% of all agricultural lands are unutilized farmland. In addition, fallow land 
accounts for 9.5% of arable land. In some years of transition, abandoned land reached one third 
of the total agricultural land [MAF]. 
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damaged74. Part of the meadows have been left under-grazed or under-mowed, 
and intrusion of shrubs and trees into the grassland took place. Some of the fertile 
semi-natural grasslands have been converted to cultivation of crops, vineyards or 
orchards. This has resulted in an irreversible disappearance of plant species 
diversity.  
Meanwhile, certain public (municipal and state) pastures have been degraded 
by the unsustainable use (over-grazing) by private and domestic animals. In 
addition, a reckless collection of some valuable wild plants (berries, herbs, and 
flowers) and animals (snail, snakes, and fish) has led to the destruction of all 
natural habitats.  
Above and beyond, some genetically modified crops have been introduced 
without an independent assessment of possible hazards for the traditional and 
organic production and human health, or providing appropriate safeguards and 
proper information. 
 
 
1.3. MARKET MODES 
 
Market-driven organic farming has emerged in recent years in the country 
(Figure 10). It is a fast-growing approach, but it is restricted to 432 farms, 
processors and traders, and covers less than 3% of the Utilized Agricultural Area 
[MAF]. There are only a few livestock farms and apiaries certified for bio-
production. In addition, 242677 ha have been approved for gathering wild organic 
fruits and herbs.  
The organic form has been introduced by business entrepreneurs who 
managed to organize and fund this new venture, arranging needed independent 
certification75 and finding potential buyers for the highly specific output. 
Produced bio fruits, vegetables, essential oil plants, herbs, spices, and honey are 
entirely for export since only a tiny internal market for organic products exists in 
the country.  
 
                                                        
74
 Approximately 20% of the agricultural lands of Bulgaria are lands of High Nature Value [MAF]. 
75
 A good part of the certification has been done by foreign bodies since until recently no Bulgarian 
certification institutions existed. 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food. 
Figure 10. Development of organic farming in Bulgaria. 
The slow development of the organic market is not only because of the higher 
prices of organic products, but is also because of the limited consumer confidence 
in the authentic character of products and certification76. In addition, eco-labeling 
of processed farm products (relying on self-regulation) has appeared, which has 
been more a part of the marketing strategy of certain companies rather than a 
genuine action for environmental improvement. 
Since 2001, the assets of public-owned irrigation companies were transferred 
to the newly-evolving Water Users Associations. However, an expected “boom” 
in efficiency (quantity and productivity) from a collective management of 
irrigation activities has not materialized. That is because of the semi-monopoly 
situation of regional state water suppliers (monopoly terms and pricing), few 
incentives for water users to innovate facilities and expand irrigation, and still 
uncompleted privatization of state irrigation assets.  
Generally, an initiation, development and maintenance of an organization of a 
large group is very costly, and such a coalition is not sustainable for a long time 
(“free rider” problem). In Bulgaria, the evolution of farmers and environmental 
associations has been additionally hampered by the big number of agrarian and 
rural agents and their diversified interests (different size of ownership and 
operation, type of farming, individual preferences, different age and horizon, etc.) 
[Bachev, 2006].  
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 Numerous fake labeling as organic or traditional products has been detected by the Organization 
for Consumer Protection and reported daily in the media.  
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1.4. PUBLIC MODES 
 
Market and private sectors have failed to effectively govern  the 
environmentally-related activities in agriculture and there has been a need for a 
third-party public intervention. However, the government and local authority 
involvement has not been significant, comprehensive, sustainable, or even related 
to the matter [Bachev, 2008]. The total budget of the Ministry of Water and 
Environment accounts for just 1.5% of the National Budget, and the agricultural 
sector gets a tiny portion of all public eco-spending [MWE]. Similarly, re-
cultivation of de-gradated farmlands by the MAF has been under way recently, 
but it accounts for merely 200-250 ha per year [MAF].  
In the past several years a number of programs have been developed to deal 
with the specific environmental challenges - National Strategy for Preservation of 
Biodiversity (1999); National Strategy for Environment (2000); National Plan for 
Agrarian and Rural Development (2000); National Programme for Limitation of 
Total Emissions of Sulphur Dioxide, VOC, and Ammonia (2002); National 
Program for Waste Management Activities (2002); Environmental Strategy for 
the Instruments of ISPA (2003), National Strategy for Management and 
Development of Water Sector (2004); National Action Plan on Climate Change 
(2004); Strategy for Developing Organic Agriculture (2005); National Action 
Program for Sustainable Management of Lands and Fights against Desertification 
(2006); National Plan for Agrarian and Rural Development (2007); National 
Environmental Strategy and Plan (2009), etc. 
In addition, national monitoring systems of the environment and biodiversity 
have been set up and a mandatory ecological assessment of public programs 
introduced. Nevertheless, the actual eco-policies rest fragmented and largely 
reactive to urgent environmental problems (natural disasters such as floods, 
storms, and drought) rather than based on a long-term strategy for sustainable 
development. Moreover, there is no efficient coordination between different 
programs and management levels. The programs and action plans are usually 
developed and executed in a highly centralized manner (by bureaucrats, foreign 
experts, and profit-making companies) without involvement of independent local 
experts, stakeholders and the public at large. In addition, there is considerable 
deficiency in the administrative capacity at local level in terms of staff, 
qualification, material and financial means. As a result of all of these, inefficiency 
in priority setting and management (incompetence and corruption) and a minor 
impact of the public programs prevails [Bachev, 2008]. 
Moreover, a multifunctional role of farming has not been effectively 
recognized, a proper system for its assessment (data and indicators) introduced, 
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and provision of a public service “environmental preservation and improvement” 
funded by the society. For instance, the measure “Agro-ecology” of the SAPARD 
was not approved until the middle of 2006 and a few projects have been funded 
since 2007. What is more, due to the mismanagement and corruption SAPARD 
(along with other EU funds), it was suspended by the EC in 2008, and a 
considerable EU funding under that scheme lost. 
Neither, the essential public institutions and infrastructure crucial for the 
sustainable farming development have been built: public system for enforcement 
of laws, regulations, and contracts does not work well; essential property rights 
(on environmental resources and biodiversity, special and organic products, GM 
products and intellectual agrarian property) are not well-defined and/or properly 
enforced; public support programs are rarely governed effectively and in the best 
interest of the legitimate beneficiaries; agricultural research is under-funded and 
can hardly perform its function for innovation and independent expertise; the 
newly established agricultural advisory system does not serve the majority of 
farms and include rural development and environmental issues; urgently needed 
public system for agrarian insurance has not been introduced; crucial agrarian and 
rural infrastructure (wholesale markets, irrigation, roads, and communications) 
has not been modernized; public support for initiating and developing farming 
associations has not been given, etc.  
A serious environmental challenge is still caused by the state deficiency in 
storing and disposing the out-of-dated or prohibited pesticides of the ancient 
public farms. Currently, those chemicals account for 11079 t and a good 
proportion of them are not stored in safe places. There are 477 registered  
abandoned storehouses for such pesticides, situated in 460 locations around the 
country, and just 38% of them are guarded [EEA]. What is more, as much as 82% 
of all polluted localities in the country are associated with these dangerous 
chemicals, and only a tiny portion of them have gone through the entire cycle of 
examination.  
A great number of international assistance projects (funded by the UN 
agencies, EU, Foreign Governments, NGOs, etc.) have been carried out to “fill the 
gap” of the national government failures. They either focus on a specific issue 
(sustainable agriculture, desertification, etc.) or mobilize local actors for 
sustainable development. These programs introduce western experiences in 
governance and try to make a difference. However, they are limited in scale and 
unsustainable in time; in some cases, they are overtaken by the local groups and 
funding improperly used, and, above all, they make no significant impact.  
The endurance of environmental and other challenges demonstrates that an 
effective system of governance has not been put in place. Subsequently, the 
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modernization of Bulgarian farms according to the EU (quality, safety, 
environmental, animal welfare, etc.) standards has been delayed; growth in farms 
productivity, competitiveness and sustainability severely restricted; and 
technological, income and eco-disparity between farms of different types, sub-
sectors and regions broadened [Bachev and Kagatsume]. 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN 
CONDITIONS OF EU CAP IMPLEMENTATION 
 
2.1. NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
 
The EU integration and CAP implementation provides new opportunities for 
Bulgarian farms. The EU funding alone, which agriculture has received from 
2007 on is 5.1 times higher than the overall level of support to farming before 
acceding. For 2007-2009, the EU funds allocated for “agrarian and rural 
development” are €733 million, for “direct payments” 722 million, and for 
“market support” €388 million. Besides, Bulgarian agriculture receives funding 
from the EU Structural Funds and the national budget. 
Furthermore, the EU accession introduces and enforces a “new order” - strict 
regulations and control; tough quality, food safety, environmental, etc. standards; 
and financial support and protection against market instability, etc. The external 
monitoring, pressure and likely sanctions by the EU, leads to better enforcement 
of laws and standards in the country. For instance, in 2007 the EC started a 
procedure for sanctions for not reducing emissions of greenhouse gasses 
according to the EU Program for Environment and Combating Adverse Climate 
Changes. In 2008, EC blocked payments for SAPARD and other programs 
because of a considerable mismanagement and corruption. 
What is more, huge EU markets are opened which enhances competition and 
lets Bulgarian farms explore their comparative advantages (low costs, high 
quality, specificity and purity of produce, etc.). The novel conditions of market 
competition and institutional restrictions also give strong incentives (pressure) for 
new investments for increasing productivity and conforming to higher product, 
technology and environmental standards.  
Environmental Governance in Conditions of EU Cap Implementation 72 
The larger and business-oriented farms are most sensitive to new market 
demand and institutional regulations since they largely benefit (or lose) from 
timely adaptation to new environmental regulations. Besides they have a higher 
capacity to generate resources and find outside (credit, equity, and public) funding 
to increase competitiveness and meet new institutional requirements [Bachev, 
2006]. The process of adaptation has been associated with appropriate land 
management and the intensification of production. The latter could revive or 
deepen some of the environmental problems (erosion, acidification, and pollution) 
unless pro-environmental governance (public order, regulation, etc.) is put in 
place to prevent that from occurring.  
On the other hand, small-scale producers and most livestock farms are having 
a hard time adapting to new competition pressure, investment needs, and new 
food safety, environmental, animal-welfare, etc. standards [Bachev and Nanseki]. 
Dairy farming is particularly vulnerable since only 1.4% of the holdings with 17% 
of the cows in the country meet EU quality, hygiene, veterinary and building 
standards [MAF]. 
Some of the farms qualified to receive “area based” direct payments from EU. 
In view of the current (low) level of support, the direct payments augment farm 
sustainability and give means for adaptation to the new standards. On the other 
hand, this mode would support less productive structures (like cooperative, 
smaller-scale, and part-time farms) and non-market forms (subsistence and 
cooperative farming). As a result, sustainability of these farms will increase – 
small-scale operations become viable; cooperatives are able to pay rent (almost 
entirely abandoned during transition); subsistence farming become more 
profitable, etc.  
Furthermore, direct payments cause an increase of farmland price and rent, 
and thus enlarge costs for land supply in the largest farms. In contrast, smaller-
scale operators retain entire subsidies and see their income increased. 
Subsequently, the transformation of land management to the most effective forms 
and restructuring of farms is further delayed. In some instances (subsistence and 
semi-market farms and member-oriented cooperatives), EU funds are used 
effectively to subsidize food self-supply of population.  
However, the EU support unevenly benefits different farms as the bulk of the 
public subsidies actually go to few farms - the larger operators (agri-firms and 
cooperatives) specialized in field crops. At the same time, many effective small-
scale farms and livestock farms1 receive no or only a tiny fraction of the direct 
payments. For instance, in 2008 less than 16% of all farms received area based 
                                                        
1
 Livestock farms are not eligible to receive any direct payments under the “area based scheme”. 
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payments averaging 2226.1 Euro per farm and 50.4 Euro per ha [MAF]. In 
addition, around 13% of the farms received national top-ups averaging 910 Euro 
per farm and 203.3 Euro per ha. Typically, the same farms touch both types of 
payments as farms specialized in field crops receive the largest public support 
(Table 3). Furthermore,  most of the subsidies go to the more developed regions 
where the biggest farms and utilized farmland are located. That further fosters the 
disparity in income and efficiency among different farms and sub-sectors. 
There are also significant EU funds for rural development exceeding 4.7 
times the relevant pre-accession level. This amount of resources lets more and 
relatively smaller farms get access to public support schemes and invest in 
modernization of enterprises. Furthermore, new essential activities are effectively 
funded such as: commercialization and diversification of farming; introduction of 
organic farming; maintaining productivity, biodiversity; agri-environment of 
protection, animal welfare; support for less-favored areas and regions with 
environmental restrictions, etc. All these would help in bringing additional 
employment and income for farmers and increasing economic and environmental 
sustainability of farms.  
 
Table 3. Share of EU and national support in Net Income of different 
Bulgarian farms in 2008 (percent) 
 
Type of farm Share of subsidies in farms’ Net Incomes  
Current subsidies Investment subsidies 
Field crops 63.2 2.1 
Horticulture 1.3 1.8 
Permanent crops 0.4 2.2 
Livestock 0.3 0 
Source: MAF Agro-statistics. 
 
Similarly, in the past2, mostly bigger farms participate in public support 
programs because they have a superior managerial and entrepreneurial experience, 
available resources, possibilities for adaptation to new requirements for quality and 
other standards, potential for preparing and wining projects, etc Besides, despite 
the strong EU (and internal pressure), it has been impossible to reform the 
                                                        
2
 SAPARD and other public programs benefited predominately large farms, cooperatives and agri-
firms [Bachev and Kagatsume]. Likewise, in 2008, the biggest part of funded projects under 
measure, “Modernization of farms” of Agrarian and Rural Development Program, were for 
agro-firms (57%) and cooperatives (15%) [MAF]. 
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inefficient system of management of public programs. Consequently, a significant 
EU funding has been blocked, while other support (such as SAPARD) irreversibly 
lost.  
Therefore, agrarian and rural development funds will probably continue to 
benefit exclusively the largest structures and the richest regions of the country, 
more abuses will take place, and CAP support will not contribute to decreasing 
economic and eco discrepancy between farms, sectors, and regions.  
 
 
2.3. IMPACT(S) ON GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 
 
The CAP implementation improves the environmental performance of 
commercial farms. There is a mandatory requirement for farms to “keep the 
farmland in a good agricultural and environmental status” in order to receive direct 
payments and participate in other public programs. Moreover, direct payments 
induce farming on previously abandoned lands, and improve the environmental 
situation and biodiversity.  
Furthermore, there is a huge budget allocated for special environmental 
measures (going beyond the “good farming practices”). The National Plan for 
Agrarian and Rural Development (2007-2013) allocates budget for “preservation 
of national resources and improvement of countryside” amounting € 623.3 million 
(27.1% of the total funding). Therefore, a number of farms taking part in various 
agri-environmental programs will gradually increase in the future3.  
Our recent survey has found that for most farms the “economic” 
sustainability (“concentration on products with secure marketing”) is still the 
dominant strategy (Figure 11). At the same time, a good portion of cooperatives 
and most parts of non-cooperative farms do not implement long-term strategies for 
keeping ecological sustainability through preserving soil fertility, observing crop 
rotation and agro-techniques requirements, etc. 
The CAP measures would positively affect the environmental performance of 
large business farms and cooperatives. Namely these enterprises (and potential big 
polluters) are under constant administrative control and severe punishment (fines, 
losing licenses, and ceasing activities) for obeying new environment, biodiversity, 
and animal welfare standards. Therefore, they are strongly interested in 
transforming their activities according to the new eco-norms, making necessary 
eco-investments, changing production structures, etc. Moreover, larger producers 
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 In 2008, there are only 27,079 approved projects supporting farms from “unfavorable”  regions 
[MAF].  
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are motivated to participate in special agro-environmental and biodiversity 
programs since they have lower costs (potential for exploring economies of scale 
and scope) and higher benefits from such long-term public contracts.  
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Source: Survey data. 
Figure 11. Share of Bulgarian farms implementing different production strategies (%). 
The experience of other EU countries demonstrates that some of the terms of 
the specific contracts for environment and biodiversity preservation, animal 
welfare, keeping tradition, etc. are all very difficult (expensive) to enforce and 
dispute. In Bulgaria, the rate of compliance with these standards would be even 
lower because of the lack of readiness and awareness, insufficient control, 
ineffective court system, domination of “personal” relations and bribes, etc. 
Correspondingly, more farms than otherwise would enroll and participate in such 
schemes (including the biggest polluters and offenders). Subsequently, the 
outcome of implementation of that sort of instruments would be less than the 
desirable (namely “European”) level.  
More to the point, direct costs and lost income for conforming to the 
requirements of the special programs in different farms vary considerably, and 
they have unequal incentives to participate. Having in mind the voluntary 
character of most CAP support instruments, we should expect that the biggest 
producers of negative impacts (large polluters and those non-compliant with 
modern quality, agronomic, biodiversity, animal welfare, etc. standards) would 
stay outside of these schemes since they have the highest environment 
enhancement costs.  
On the other hand, small contributors would like to join since they do not 
command great efforts (and additional costs) compared to the supplementary net 
benefit. Moreover, the government is less likely to set up high performance 
standards because of the perceived “insignificant” environmental challenges, the 
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strong internal political pressure from farmers, and the possible external problems 
with the EU control (and sanctions) on cross-compliance. Therefore, CAP 
implementation will probably have a modest positive impact on the environment 
performance of Bulgarian farms. 
The public support and new public demand give a push to further 
development of market modes such as organic farming, industry-driven eco-
initiatives (eco-labeling, standards, and professional codes of behavior), protected 
high quality products4, system of fair-trade, production of alternative (wind and 
manure) energy at farm, etc. For instance, the significant EU market and lower 
local costs create strong incentives for investment in organic and specific 
productions by the large enterprises - farms, partnerships and joint ventures 
(including non-agrarian and foreign participants). Similarly, new incentives for 
production of bio-fuel and clean energy would induce development of a new area 
of farm activity (new sub-sectors) associated with that new public and market 
demand.  
Principally, the small farms have less capacity to put together or find 
necessary capital and expertise for initiating, developing, certifying and marketing 
in all these new ventures. Besides, the coalition (development, management, and 
exit) costs between small-scale producers are extremely high to reach the effective 
operation level (allowing exploring technological economies of scale and scope or 
technologically required minimum of inputs). Therefore, the latter either stays out 
of these new businesses or has to integrate into larger or non-farm ventures. 
However, assuring the effective traceability of the origin and quality for small 
farms is very costly and they are not preferable partners for integrators 
(processors, retailers, and exporters). What is more, the internal market for 
organic and specialized farm products would unlikely develop fast having in mind 
the low income of population and the lack of confidence in public and private 
system of control. 
Some economic and/or ecological needs (such as economizing on scale and 
scope or high interdependency of assets) would continue to bring about a change 
in size and governance of individual farms and/or evolution of group 
organizations, co-operations, and joint ventures. For instance, a big 
interdependency of activities requires concerted actions for achieving certain eco-
effects; a high asset dependency between livestock manure (over) supplier and 
nearby (manure-demanding) organic crop farms necessitates a coordination, etc.  
                                                        
4
 Such as Protected Designation of Origin, Protected Geographical Indication, and Traditional 
Specialty Guaranteed. 
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A special governing size and/or mode is also imposed by some of the 
institutional requirements. For example, a mandatory minimum scale of activities 
is set for taking part in certain public programs (e.g. marketing, agri-ecology, 
biodiversity, organic farming, tradition and cultural heritage): signing a 5-year 
public environmental contract dictates a long-term lease or purchase of managed 
land, etc. Our recent survey has proved that as much as 41% of the non-
cooperative farms and 32% of the cooperatives are in the middle of investigation 
of possible membership in a professional organization. Producers’ groupings are 
further stimulated by the available new public support (training, advising, and 
funding) for farmers’ associations.  
Some of the existing production cooperatives would also profit from their 
comparative advantages (interdependency and complementarily to individual 
farms, potential for exploring economy of scale and scope on institutionally 
determined investments, adapting to formal requirements for support, using 
expertise, financing and executing projects, not-for-profit character, etc.), and 
extend their activities into eco-projects, environmental services, eco-mediation 
between members, etc.  
Thus, an immediate result of the new market and public opportunities for 
getting additional benefits (income and profit) from environmental products and 
services will be an amelioration of the economic performance and overall 
sustainability of a number of farms and rural households.  
The CAP implementation will push the modernization of farms’ structures 
through widening the variety of contractual and organizational innovations - 
specific sorts of contracts, new types of producers’ associations, spreading 
vertically-integrated modes, etc. Special forms are also emerging, allowing agents 
to take advantage of large public programs which specialize in project 
preparation, management, and execution; invest in “relations capital” or 
“negative” entrepreneurship; form modes for lobbying and representation; and 
make coalitions for complying with formal criteria (e.g. minimum size of utilized 
agricultural area for direct and agro-ecology payments, membership requirements 
for producers’ organizations), etc.  
CAP measures and enhanced competition foster the restructuring of 
commercial farms according to modern market, technological, and institutional 
standards. A large part of agrarian inputs, technologies, and outputs is 
increasingly having a “mass” (standardized) character and market transacting 
dominate at farm gates. There is also a parallel tendency toward specialization of 
productions for “niche markets” and products with special quality - specific 
origins, special technologies, special qualities, etc. All of that requires investments 
with a higher specificity to a particular buyer(s), and “integrated” management of 
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activity in farming, processing, retailing and exporting [Bachev, 2006]. Besides, 
some diversification of enterprises into related activities (trade with origins and 
agro-tourism) for dealing with market risk is to grow. All these bring more new, 
special modes for private governance such as long-term contracts, collective 
agreements (codes of professional behavior), trilateral modes (independent third-
party certification/control), and “quasi” or complete integration. 
In the new market and institutional environment, many livestock farms are 
less sustainable because of the low productivity and competitiveness and non-
compliance with the EU quality, hygiene, animal welfare and eco-standards 
[Bachev and Manolov].  
That is particularly true for the small-scale unregistered producers which 
dominate the sector (Table 4). What is more, only a third of dairy holdings believe 
their production capacity corresponds to the modern requirements of competition, 
productivity, and justification of improvement of environmental performance and 
animal welfare.  
Nevertheless, merely one-seventh of dairy farms have the potential (internal 
capacity and access to outside sources) to fund the necessary investment 
associated with the adaptation to new norms and standards.  
Our survey of dairy farms has found  that the greatest part of unregistered 
farms believes that CAP measures would have a “neutral impact“ on their income, 
volume and technology of production, investment level, product quality, access to 
public programs, improvement of environmental care, improvement of animal 
welfare, development of infrastructure, possibilities for new income generation, 
and social status of farm households (Table 5). A bulk of firms expects a 
“positive” effect in all above directions while cooperatives are optimistic for 
improvement of animal welfare and pessimistic for the impact on income and 
access to public programs. 
 
Table 4. Share of farms with large and good capacity for adaptation to EU 
requirements for the dairy sector (percent) 
 
Farms capacity Unregistered Firms Co-ops Total 
Extend of knowledge on new requirements  22.7 63.6 100 38.2 
Available skills and knowledge for adaptation 22.7 54.5 100 35.3 
Available production capacity 27.3 45.4  32.3 
Improvement of quality and hygiene standards 36.4 72.7 100 50.0 
Improving animal welfare 31.8 72.7  44.1 
Improving environmental performance 31.8 54.5  38.2 
Finding necessary investment 9.1 27.3  14.7 
Source: survey data, 
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Table 5. Expectation for impact of EU CAP implementation on your farm 
(% of farms) 
 
Impact on: Unregistered Firms Total 
 + - + - + - 
Volume of production  22.7 9.1 36.4 27.3 26.5 14.7 
Income of farm  22.7 9.1 45.4 18.2 29.4 14.7 
Technology of production  13.6 4.5 54.5 9.1 26.5 5.9 
Investment  18.2 4.5 45.4 18.2 26.5 8.8 
Product quality  18.2 0 45.4 0 26.5 0 
Access to public programs 9.1 4.5 54.5 9.1 23.5 8.8 
Improvement of animal care  13.6 0 45.4 9.1 26.5 2.9 
Improvement of care for environment 
9.1 0 54.5 9.1 23.5 2.9 
Development of infrastructure 9.1 0 54.5 9.1 23.5 2.9 
Opportunities for new income 
18.2 9.1 36.4 9.1 23.5 8.8 
Social status of your household 13.6 4.5 45.4 27.3 23.5 11.8 
Source: survey data (+) - positive impact; (-) - negative impact. 
 
A few livestock farms will be able to adapt through specialized investment for 
enlarging and conforming to the new institutional restrictions by the deadline for 
full compliance in the end of 2009. Meanwhile, the EU and public pressure for 
enforcement of standards in the commercial sector increases and leads to closure 
or take-over of a greater part of livestock farms. The related reduction of farms 
and animals, and improved manure management, is associated with a drop of the 
environmental burden by the formal sector (less over-grazing, fewer manure 
production and mismanagement, etc.). We estimated that few subsistence and 
semi-market farms would undertake market orientation and extend their present 
scale because of the high costs for farm enlargement and adjustment - no 
entrepreneurial capital and resources available, low investment and training 
capability of aged farmers, and insufficient demand for farm products [Bachev, 
2006]. Newly-introduced, specific support to “semi-market” farms would have no 
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considerable impact on subsistence because of the inappropriate criteria5 and the 
insufficient level of support. Besides, this measure focuses on less prospective 
structures (small, semi-subsistence holdings) with low potential for adaptation to 
volume, quality, safety, animal welfare and environmental requirements, and 
needs of processors and distributors. Experience has proved that for the first two 
years of implementation of the measure for “semi-market farms,” only a few 
thousand applications have been actually made (around 5% of the initially 
projected number of potential beneficiaries). Currently, it is under consideration 
the redesign of that measure and redirection of funding to other areas where 
demand is big (e.g. “support to young farmers” and “modernization of farms”). 
In addition to all these,  the authority is practically (technically and 
politically) impossible to enforce the official standards in that huge, informal 
(subsistence and semi-market) sector of the economy. Therefore, massive (semi) 
subsistence farming with primitive technologies, poor food safety, and 
environmental and animal welfare standards will continue to exist in years to 
come. 
We have already demonstrated that the hybrid modes (public-private and 
public-collective) are much more efficient than the pure public forms given the 
coordination, incentives, and control advantages. Moreover, enforcement of most 
labor, animal welfare, biodiversity, etc. standards is very difficult or impossible at 
all. That is particularly true for the huge informal sector of the economy. Here 
individual “punishments” do not work well while overall damages from  
incompliance are immense.  
That is why policies should be oriented to the market orientation of 
subsistence farms, support and incentives for collective modes, and eco-programs 
for informal farms and groups. Principally, public support to voluntary 
environmental initiatives of farmers and rural organizations (informing, training, 
assisting, and funding) would be much more effective than mandatory public 
modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing costs.  
Furthermore, involvement of farmers, farmers’ organizations, and interests 
groups in priority setting and management of public programs at different levels is 
to be institutionalized in order to decrease information asymmetry and possibility 
for opportunism, diminish costs for coordination, implementation and control, and 
increase overall efficiency and impact. 
                                                        
5
 The same criteria (as in other EU countries) for defining “semi-market farms” is used – farms with 
size of 1-4 European Size Units (1ESU=1200 Euro). However, for the Bulgarian conditions, an 
income within this range is quite big (above the average for agriculture and other sectors of the 
economy) to be considered as “semi-market” activity. 
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All surveys show that many of the specific EU regulations are not well-
known by the implementing of authorities and majority of farmers [Bachev, 
2008]. What is more, our recent survey indicates that as much as 47% of non-
cooperative farms and 43% of cooperatives are still “not aware or only partially 
aware” of the support measures of CAP and how they are different from the direct 
payments. Furthermore, as much as 62% of the farms report that they will not 
apply for such support due to the “lack of financial resources” (26%), “not 
compliance with formal requirements” (18%), and “clumsy bureaucratic 
procedure” (17%).  
In addition, there are still a number of “blank points” in adaptation of EU 
regulations in Bulgarian agriculture. For instance, “the whole farm” is a subject of 
support in agri-environmental measures (such as organic farming and agro-
ecology), but its borders are not defined at all in the national legislation. That 
creates serious difficulties since land and other resources of the majority of farms 
are considerably fragmented and geographically dispersed. 
Above and beyond, most of the farm managers have no adequate training and 
managerial capability and are old in age with a small learning and adaptation 
potential. For instance, the average age of the farm manager is 61 and 70% of 
them are older than 55 [MAF].  
The lack of readiness, experience, and potential for adaptation in public and 
private sectors alike would require some time lag until the “full” implementation 
of the CAP in “Bulgarian” conditions. The latter will depend on the pace of 
building an effective public and private capacity, and training of (acquiring 
learning by doing experience by) bureaucrats, farmers, and other agrarian agents. 
As a consequence of the internal and external factors, a farm’s modernization and 
adaptation will be delayed, and its competitiveness and sustainability diminished. 
Moreover, there will be significant inequalities in application (and enforcement) 
of new laws and standards in diverse regions of the country and sectors of 
agriculture and in farms of different type and size. 
Last but not least important, there is a growing competition for environmental 
resources between different industries and interests. That push is further 
overtaking the natural resources away from the farm governance and changing 
into non-agricultural (urban, tourism, transport, industry, etc.) use. The needs to 
compete for and share resources would deepen conflicts between various interests 
and social groups, regions, and even with neighboring states. All that would 
require a special governance (cooperation, public order, and hybrid form) on 
local, national and transnational scales to reconcile conflicts in the benefit of an 
effective environmental management.  
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2.3. GOVERNANCE OF AGRO-ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 
 
Agro-ecosystems services and their governance are significantly affected by 
post-communist transformation and EU integration [Bachev, 2009]. We will 
present challenges in evolution of that important area by analyzing structure, 
efficiency and prospects of governance of agro-ecosystem services in Zapadna 
Stara Planina (ZSP) – a mountainous region in North-West Bulgaria. 
Agro-ecosystems in ZSP are part of the unique ecosystem of ZSP6 and 
provide a wide range of specific services (Figure 12). A great number of agents 
from and outside the region benefit from and affect the services of these ago-
ecosystems – landowners7, farmers, residents, businesses, visitors, consumers, 
scientists, and interest groups.  
 
Figure 12. Services of Agro-ecosystems in Zapadna Stara Planina, Bulgaria. 
                                                        
6
 ZSP covers an area of 4043 km2 (2099 km2 in Bulgaria and a 1944 km2 in Serbia) of which 60% is 
forests and the rest is farmland [Grigorova and Kazakova]. 
7
 50% of the pollution in ZSP own agricultural lands [Grigorova and Kazakova].  
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Approximately 70% of farmland in ZSP comprises meadows and pastures 
[MAF]. They provide feed for farm and household animals, and create good 
conditions for the development of grazing livestock (sheep, goats, cattle, buffalo, 
and horses) and domestic animals (poultry, rabbits, and pigs). In addition, there 
are plenty of wild flowers and herbs which favor bee-keeping and herbal-honey 
production, as well as a collection of natural medical plants.  
Furthermore, a wide range of farm products are produced in this environment 
used for the provisioning of the local population and marketing. Some of local 
farm-based products are well-known for quality, unique taste and original 
character (strawberries, raspberries, blackberries, berry jams, herb honey, sheep 
yogurt and cheeses, lamb meat, wool, furs, prunes, and plum brandy) and 
marketed at regional, national and international markets. Simultaneously, they 
favor development of related productions and services being an important income 
source for local populations – (jam, dairy, brandy, and leather) processing, dying 
wool, weaving and crafts making, on-farm and direct marketing, and agro-
tourism.  
For many local and temporary residents, interactions with agro-ecosystems 
are the favorite mode of recreation (part-time or hobby farming or short or longer 
term visits) or lifestyle (weekend/summer houses).  
Local traditions and ethnic culture of Torlaks and Karakachans are closely 
related to agro-ecosystems and farming systems – specific agricultural and related 
products (e.g. Chiprovtsi hand-made carpets), crop varieties and animal breeds, 
production methods/technologies, festivals, cuisine, and crafts.  
The unique shape and quality of the landscape is a critical feature of agro-
ecosystems dominated by natural or semi-natural high mountain pastures, riparian 
meadows, and stony and rocky terrains. All these features of agro-ecosystems 
attract many visitors from the region, country and abroad. 
Next, agro-ecosystems contribute significantly to maintaining and improving 
soil quality - vegetation cover reducing soil loss and degradation and promoting 
water infiltration. Furthermore, carbon sequestration is an important service of 
grasslands, berry bushes, orchards and vineyards, storing considerable amounts of 
CO2 stock. 
Agro-ecosystems also provide combined services with larger ecosystems of 
ZSP. The great variety of wild fruits, herbs, chestnuts, mushrooms, birds, animals 
and fish are available and picked up or hunted by the local population and visitors. 
What is more, some of them are commercially gathered for processing and sells 
bring additional incomes for around 20% of population [Grigorova and 
Kazakova]. 
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The ecosystem of ZSP is a source of clean mountain and mineral water used 
by farmers (animals and irrigation), residents (drinking and household needs), 
businesses (inputs and bottling) and health centers (balneotherapy) in the region 
and neighboring areas. Besides, it purifies the water and air and regulates the 
climate, making the region a favorite destination for tourism, recreation and 
treatment8. Moreover, some of country’s most popular natural wonders like the 
Rocks of Belogradchik9, Iskar Gorge, and a number of picks, waterfalls, and caves 
are located in ZSP, enhancing the cultural services of ecosystem.  
The territory of ZSP is high with ornithological and botanical importance and 
is designated as a Pan-European network NATURA 2000 site (Map 1). 
Maintaining this rich biodiversity is a great service of the ecosystem of ZSP. For 
instance, in its flora, there are more than 2,000 species of higher plants (among 
which 12 are Bulgarian and 79  are Balkan endemics10), while its fauna comprise 
more than 180 bird species, more than 50 species of mammals, 26 species of 
amphibians and reptiles, and many butterfly species of conservation importance 
[Grigorova and Kazakova]. That increases the educational and scientific services 
of this unique ecosystem as well. 
Various market, private and public modes are used for governing of agro-
ecosystem services in ZSP (Figure 13).  
Post-communist reforms transferred entire agrarian activity from large public 
farms into market and private governance. Private management and market 
adjustments are associated with the domination of small-scale and subsistence 
holdings (Table 6), sharp decline in crop and livestock (except goat) productions 
and general de-intensification of activity.  
 
                                                        
8
 Well-known mountainous resorts Berkovitza, Varshetz, Izketz are located there. 
9
 It is nominated to be one of New 7 Natural Wonders of the World. 
10
 Besides, hill “Vrashka Chuka” is a worlds-only place of Eranthis bulgaricus. 
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Map 1. Natura 2000 Habitat directive sites (light green color) and Bird directive sites (dark 
green color).  
 
 
Figure 13. Modes of governance of agro-ecosystem services in Zapadna Stara Planina. 
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Table 6. Major characteristics of farms in Zapadna Stara Planina, Bulgaria 
 
Indicator Value Indicator Value 
Number of farms 12151 Share of farms with cattle (%) 17.2 
Average Utilized Agricultural 
Area (ha) 
0.997 Average cattle per farm 2.9 
Share of arable land (%) 33.6 Share of farms with sheep (%) 51.1 
Share of cereals (%) 18.4 Average sheep per farm 5.5 
Share of horticulture (%) 4.3 Share of farms with goats (%) 62.7 
Share of grassland (%) 58.7 Average goats per farm 2.6 
Share of permanent crops (%) 4.9 Share of farms with pigs (%) 47.2 
Share of farms with bees (%) 6.3 Average pigs per farm 1.5 
Average bees colonies per farm 7.1 Share of farms with poultry (%) 69.0 
  Average poultry per farm  14.2 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food. 
 
Private ownership introduced better incentives for environmental stewardship 
while small operational size led to overcoming certain problems of large public 
enterprises from the past and revived some traditional and sustainable 
technologies, varieties and products. By-products from this market and private 
governance have been an overall improvement of the agro-ecosystems services in 
ZSP. Farm and related products received “organic” character, obtaining a 
reputation for high quality and safety. The region has become an attractive 
destination for many local and foreign tourists willing to experience genuine 
nature, traditional cuisine and lifestyle. 
Market-driven organic production emerged in recent years, but it is restricted 
to a few farms, processors and traders. The country’s biggest producers of organic 
raspberries and bee-honey are located in ZSP.  
A number of effective private modes have evolved and govern relations 
between farmers, processors, food stores, and consumers. High specificity and 
capacity dependency are widely safeguarded by cooperation (services and 
processing), long-term contracts (marketing of milk and organic berries), 
interlinked organization (milk marketing against free provision of cooling vanes 
and credit), and compete integration (diversification of farming into processing 
and agro-tourism). Often, non-agrarian agents (processors, food stores, restaurant 
chains, and exporters) are driven by market or institutional demand initiates, 
funds, and integrate eco-farming. That is the case with Danone buying milk from 
big dairy farms (and enforcing safety, quality, environmental, and animal-welfare 
standards), a Japanese investor financing organic apiaries and exporting bio-
honey, and a leading restaurant chain integrating dairy farming and processing.  
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Cooperatives are the typical mode having great potential to organize highly 
specific member’s transactions (supply of critical inputs/services, processing, eco-
management, and marketing), explore economies of scale and scope, mediate 
relations between landowners and users, and adapt to requirements of banks and 
public institutions.  
Market and private voluntary, not-for-profit  and for-profit forms contribute 
significantly to the improvement of eco-governance, but their scope is usually 
restricted to a portion of agro-ecosystems (services). For instance, one fifth of 
agricultural lands have been abandoned, which has caused an uncontrolled 
“development” of species, allowing the expansion of some and suppressing 
others. Furthermore, part of permanent natural and semi-natural meadows have 
been left under-grazed or under-mowed, and intrusion of shrubs and trees into the 
grassland took place, putting pressure on priority species (such as Souslik) and 
related chains (Marbled Polecat) [Grigorova and Kazakova]. Meanwhile, 
communal and private pastures close to settlements have been degraded by 
unsustainable use (over-grazing).  
In addition, a reckless collection of certain wild plants (berries, herbs, and 
flowers) and animals (snails and snakes) have led to the destruction of natural 
habitats. Erosion has been a major factor for land degradation as a result of 
inappropriate agro-techniques, deficiency of anti-erosion measures, and 
uncontrolled deforestation. Damages are further enhanced by the dominating 
negative rate of fertilizer compensation of N, P and K intakes and the unbalanced 
application of nutrient components. In addition, the lack of effective manure 
storage capacities in most farms and modern sewer and garbage collection 
systems in rural areas bring about air, soil and water pollution, and affect the 
beauty of the scenery.  
What is more, most cooperatives have shown serious disadvantages 
(ineffective management, low incentives for long-term investment, and small 
adaptability to members and market needs) and most of them have gone bankrupt 
in recent years. Similarly, a majority of dairy farms and processors have failed to 
adapt to tough EU (safety, hygiene, environment, and animal-welfare) standards 
and have had to cease commercial activity. Finally, private interests of particular 
individuals/groups have harmed legitimate public rights to ecosystem services due 
to restricting access, converting to proper use (farm/forest land into construction), 
or escaping public order on natural resource management.  
After the EU accession, new opportunities have appeared to get public 
support for diverse private and collective activities related to agro-ecosystem 
services. For instance, between 2007-2013, the National Plan for Agricultural and 
Rural Development (NPARD) will provide significant funding for area-based and 
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agro-environmental payments (organic farming, management of agricultural lands 
with high natural value, traditional livestock, protection of soils and water, and 
preservation of land-shaft features); modernization of farms, processing and 
marketing; diversification of activity; infrastructural development; keeping 
traditions; training, etc. Moreover, requirements for “cross-compliance” (with 
modern quality, safety, eco, and animal-welfare standards) for receiving public 
support will be introduced. Funding for projects related to eco-system services is 
also available from Fund LIFE+, Operational Programs “Environment”, “Fishery 
and Aquaculture”, and “Regional Development”.  
However, implementation of the new public order is not effective because of 
the lack of agents’ awareness and experience, inadequate administrative capacity, 
and mismanagement. Furthermore, due to restricting criteria11, complicated 
procedures and high transacting costs, the majority of farms (small-scale and 
subsistent holdings) have not been able to participate in diverse support schemes.  
For example, less than 5% of all farms from ZSP, comprising 18% of 
grasslands and 8% of arable land, are registered in Land Parcels Identification 
System (indicating land eligible for CAP support). From SAPARD, agro-
ecological measures benefited less than 100 farms from ZSP, while other supports 
went predominately to large farms and more developed regions. Up-to-date 
Program “Environment” funded no biodiversity projects [MWE].  
In some cases, enforcement of eco-standards is difficult since costs for 
detection of offenders are high. For instance, the forbidden practice of burning of 
(stubble) fields is widespread, causing deterioration of soil quality, extermination 
of micro-flora and habitats, contribution to green-house emissions, multiplying 
forests fires, and diminishing visibility [EEA]. Likewise, requirements for the 
minimum-maximum number of animals on pastures is very difficult to enforce 
(only 5 % of beneficiaries being subject to inspection). 
Thus, implementation of EU common policies would have no desired impact 
on agro-ecosystem services unless special measures are taken to improve the 
management of public programs and extend public support to dominating small-
scale and subsistence farms. 
 
 
 
                                                        
11
 For direct and agro-ecological payment,s minimum farm size is 1 ha (permanent crops 0.5 ha) and 
0.5 ha as 0.1 ha parcel size also applies (landless livestock holdings are not eligible). NPARD 
does not provide support for restoration of abandoned farmland and organic livestock (but 
forage) production. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
3. SUSTAINABILITY OF FARM STRUCTURES 
 
3.1. SUSTAINABILITY OF BUSINESS FARMS 
 
Large business farms govern a significant part of the activity in cereals, 
industrial crops, permanent crops, poultry and pigs. Most of them are registered as 
some type of agro-firm - Sole Traders (58.3%), Companies (35.4%), and 
Associations (6.3%). Big farms account for a tiny portion of all farms, but 
concentrate a significant part on UAA (Table 1) and produce the bulk of the 
Standard Gross Margin (SGM) in major sub-sectors (Figure 14). 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food. 
Figure 14. Share of farms with SGM smaller than 2 ESU and bigger than 100 ESU in total 
SGM and farms with different specialization (percent). 
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Business farms are commonly large specialized enterprises. Most of them 
were set up as family and partnership organizations during the first years of 
transition by younger generation entrepreneurs. Specific management skills and 
“social” status, and a combination of partnership assets (technological knowledge, 
business and other ties, and available resources) led to the rapid extension of 
farms through an enormous concentration of (management or ownership of) 
resources, exploration of economy of scale and size, and modernization of 
enterprises [Bachev, 2006].  
During the long period of institutional and market transformation (unsettled 
rights on resources, imperfect regulations, huge uncertainty and instability) the 
personal relations and “quasi” or entirely-integrated modes were extensively used 
to overcome transaction difficulties. In addition, some state companies were taken 
over by managers and registered as shareholdings. Joint ventures with non-
agrarian and foreign capital have been increasingly set up as well. Business farms 
have been constantly extending their share in managed agrarian (and related) 
resources and output taking over smaller farms, incorporating new types of 
activities and applying new organizational schemes. 
Business farms are profit-oriented organizations, and farmer(s) have great 
incentives to invest in farm-specific (human, material, and intangible) capital 
because they are the sole owners of the residual rights (benefits) of the farm. 
Owners are family members or close partners, and the internal transaction costs 
for coordination, decision-making, and motivation are not high. An increased 
number of coalitions (partnerships) gives additional opportunity for internal 
division of labor and profiting from specialization (e.g. full-time engagement in 
production management, market relations, paper work, technological 
development, etc.). 
The organizational style of a firm is more and more preferred since it 
provides the opportunity to overcome coalition difficulties (e.g. forming joint 
ventures with outside capital and disputed ownership rights through the court 
system); to diversify into farm related or independent businesses (trade, agro-
tourism, and processing); to develop firm-specific intangible capital 
(advertisement, brand names, and public confidence) and its extension into a 
daughter company, trade (sell or licensing), and transfer through generations 
(inheriting); to overcome existing institutional restrictions (e.g. for direct foreign 
investments in farmland and engaging in trade with cereals, vine, and dairy); and 
to provide explicit rights for taking part in particular types of transactions (such as 
export licensing, privatization deals, assistance programs, etc.).  
Their large size and reputation makes business farms preferable partners in 
inputs supply and marketing deals. Besides, business farms have giant negotiating 
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power and effective economic and political mechanisms to enforce contracts. 
They also possess great potential to collect market information, search for the best 
partners, use experts and innovation, to meet special (collateral) requirements and 
bare the risks and costs of failures.  
Large farms have strong incentives and potential for innovation – available 
resources to test, adapt, buy, and introduce new methods, technologies, and 
varieties, and possibility to hire leading experts and arrange direct supply from 
consulting companies or research institutes.  
In addition, they could explore economy of scale and scope on production and 
management (e.g. “package” arrangement of credits for many projects and 
interlinking inputs supply with know-how supply, crediting and marketing). They 
are also able to invest considerable relation-specific capital (information, 
expertise, reputation, lobbying, and bribing) for dealing with funding institutions, 
agrarian bureaucracy, and market agents at a national or even international scale. 
Furthermore, they have enormous political power to lobby for government 
support in their best interests. All these give considerable advantages to the 
business type farming organization.  
Under the conditions of non-working court and contract enforcement systems, 
all critical transactions are governed (controlled and protected) through internal 
modes. Farm-specific assets such as critical machinery, vineyards, orchards, 
animals, processing facilities, and adjoining land are all safeguarded by 
ownership. Low-cost standard (one-season or share rent), lease-in contracts are 
widely used to govern land supply from tens and hundreds of proprietors. Critical 
transactions are integrated through extensive labor employment. Besides, core 
labor (specialists and mechanists) is hired on a permanent basis and special forms 
such as output-based compensation, interlinking (housing and services), social 
disbursements, paid holidays, etc. are further used to enhance motivation.  
One’s own supply (making) rather than outside procurement is typical for the 
essential services and inputs, which prevent risk from unilateral dependency 
(opportunism of supplier) or missing market situation. In the case of high asset 
interdependency (product specificity and quality and quantity dependency),a 
downstream partner’s reciprocal supply of inputs against marketing is applied. 
Funding is secured through an effective combination of equity, debt, public 
and hybrid modes. Standard activities and assets are financed by bank credit since 
it is easy to arrange a loan. Alternatively, farm-specific investments are financed 
through private modes – one’s own sources, “personal” loans and co-investments. 
Also, special contract modes are used to mitigate funding difficulties (e.g. 
shortage of working capital) or to facilitate mutually-dependent relations with 
buyers and suppliers, such as delayed payments for inputs supply (zero interest 
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and “loans in kind”), interlinking credit with inputs supply and marketing, leasing 
or accepting outside investment (“hostage taking” and joint ownership) of long-
term assets.  
Business farms have been quite successful in benefiting from the various 
preferential public support programs (SAPARD and State Fund Agriculture), 
developing good proposals, meeting formal requirements, dealing with 
complicated paper work, and “arranging” the selection of their projects for 
modernization and expansion of enterprises, diversifying into related businesses, 
improving environmental performance, etc. Furthermore they get the greatest 
share of EU CAP support measures (direct and agro-ecology payments, agrarian 
and rural development support, etc.) which additionally enhance their efficiency. 
In the marketing farm, output and services and  classical trade across the 
market (sells on wholesale market and  business with market agents) dominate. 
Since the main part of a farm’s product has a standardized (commodity) character, 
market prices and competition effectively govern relations with partners. 
However, when specificity of output to a particular buyer (processor or retailer) is 
high (technology, quality, packaging, time of delivery, origin, and site-
specificity), then delivery contracts with a respective partner are employed to 
tailor or protect transactions.  
Intra-firm processing and retailing is practiced by some farms. Larger 
operational size and frequency of transacting provide an economic opportunity for 
the internal exploration of interdependent assets in farming-processing-retailing. 
Vertical integration helps protect dependent investments and payoffs from 
marketing-processed and retail products - e.g. getting the entire profit (value-
added and final products), brand name trade, lessened market dependency (easy 
storage and transportation), etc. Large business farms have significant 
comparative advantages in terms of adaptability, governance, and productivity. 
That leads to further redistribution of farming activities in this effective and 
perspective structure. Accordingly, agricultural is increasingly characterized by 
the domination of larger and highly competitive business enterprises, which will 
take over and concentrate most activities in all sub-sectors. Business farms will be 
sustained in the future by maintaining (enhancing) their comparative advantages 
in terms of adaptability, governance, and productivity by having greater access to 
EU markets and opportunities to benefit from the large public support programs 
for agrarian and rural development.  
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3.2. SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATIVES 
 
The cooperatives concentrate a major part of cereals, oil and forage crops, 
orchards and vineyards, and they are key service providers for their members and 
rural agents. The long-term cooperative tradition was an important factor for the 
emergence of more than 3,000 “new types” of production cooperatives during and 
after the liquidation of old “cooperative” structures. 
Furthermore, often the cooperative was the single form for a farming 
organization in the absence of settled rights on main agrarian resources and/or 
inherited high interdependence acquired by individuals’ assets [Bachev, 2006]. 
More than 2 million Bulgarians have received individual stakes in the assets of 
liquidated ancient public farms. In addition to their small size, a great part of these 
shares were in indivisible assets (large machinery, buildings, and processing and 
irrigation facilities). Therefore, new owners had no alternative but to liquidate 
(sales, consumption, and distortion) or keep them up as a joint (cooperative) 
ownership.  
In many cases, ownership on farmland was restituted with adjoined fruit trees 
and vineyards, and much of the activities (e.g. mechanization, plant protection, 
and irrigation) could be practically executed solely in cooperation. Most of 
landowners happened to live away from rural areas, have other business, be old of 
age, or possess no skills or capital to start their own farms. In the absence of big 
demand for farmlands and/or confidence in emerging private farming, new 
evolving cooperatives have pulled land plots of more than 40% of the novel 
proprietors in the 1990s.  
The cooperative, rather than other formal collective (e.g. firm), mode has 
been mostly preferred. It allows individual members easy (low costs) entrance and 
exit from the coalition, preservation of full control on a major private resource 
such as land, and democratic participation in (and control on) management (“one 
member-one vote” principle). Besides, the cooperative form gives some important 
tax advantages such as tax exemption on sale transactions with individual 
members and on received rent in kind (Double-taxation Law). Also there are 
possibilities for organization of transactions which are not legitimate for other 
modes such as credit supply, marketing, and lobbying at a nation-wide scale 
(Antimonopoly Law).  
Moreover, most of the cooperatives develop along with or after the 
emergence of small-scale and subsistent farming. Namely, “not-for-profit” 
character and strong member (rather than market) orientation attracted the 
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membership of many households. Production co-ops have been perceived as an 
effective (cheap and stable) form for supply of highly specific to individual farm’s 
inputs and services (production of feed for animals; mechanization of major 
operations; storage, processing, and marketing of farm output), and/or food for 
household consumption.  
The relatively bigger operational size of cooperatives gives them great 
opportunity for efficient use of labor (teamwork, division, and specialization of 
work), farmland (cultivation in big consolidated plots, effective crop rotation, and 
application of chemicals and irrigation), and material assets (exploration of 
economy of scale and scope on large machinery and equipment and eco-
management). In addition, they have superior potential to minimize market 
uncertainty (“risk pooling” and advertisement), and organize some critical 
transactions (better access to agrarian credit; stronger negotiating positions in 
input supply and marketing and facilitate land consolidation through lease-in and 
lease-out deals; and introduce technological innovations and effective 
environmental management), to invest in intangible capital (reputation, brand 
names, labels, and origins), etc. In the situation of “missing markets”, the 
cooperative mode has been the single form for organization of certain transactions 
in villages and rural areas undertaking bakery, processing, retail trade, etc.  
Cooperative activities are not difficult to manage since internal (members) 
demand for output and services is known and “marketing” secured. In addition, 
co-ops concentrate on a few highly standardized products (wheat and sunflower) 
with a stable market and good profitability. All this assists financing, as advance 
funding of activities commissioned by members is commonly practiced, while 
producing universal (mass) commodities is easily financed by public programs or 
commercial credit.  
Furthermore, co-ops offer low-cost, long-term leasing of land. That is often 
coupled with simultaneous lease-out deals as a specific mode for cashing co-ops 
output or facilitating relations between landlords and private farms. The 
cooperatives broadly practice an integral organization of critical “services” and 
inputs supply, benefiting from internal specialization and division of activity. 
Marketing of risky output is governed by effective delivery contracts or integrated 
into own processing. 
Output-based payment of labor is common, which restricts opportunism and 
minimizes internal transaction costs. Besides, production cooperatives provide 
employment for members who otherwise would have no other job opportunities - 
housewives, pre-retired, or retired persons. They are preferable to the employer 
since they offer relatively high job security, social and pension payments, days-off 
and paid annual holidays, and opportunities for professional (including career) 
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development. Given the considerable transacting benefits, most of the co-op 
members accept lower than market returns on their resources - lower wages, 
inferior or no rent for land, and dividends for shares. 
There have been some adjustments of size, memberships, and production 
structure in cooperatives (Table 1). A number of them have moved toward more 
“business like” governance, applying market orientation, profit-making goals, 
close and small-membership policy, complex joint-ventures with other 
organizations, etc. That has been a result of overtaking  co-ops’ management by 
younger entrepreneurs, improving the governance, taking advantage of new 
market opportunities and public support programs, and establishing some of them 
as key regional players. 
At the same time, the traditional cooperative has shown certain disadvantages 
as a form of farm organization. A large coalition (averaging 240 members) makes 
individual or collective control on management very difficult and costly. That 
gives great possibility for mismanagement and/or sets using co-ops in the best 
interests of managers and groups around them (on-job consumption, unprofitable 
deals for members, transfer of profit and property, and corruption).  
Besides, there are differences in investment preferences of diverse members 
due to the non-tradable character of cooperative shares. While working, younger 
members are interested in long-term investments and growth of salaries, income 
in kind, and other on-job benefits, while older and non-working members favor 
current gains (income, land rent and dividend). Given the fact that most of the 
members are older in (pre-retired and retired) age, smallholders, and non-
permanent employees, incentives for long-term investment in cooperatives have 
been very low.  
Finally, many co-ops fall short in adapting to diversified (service) needs of 
members and exploring the potential of inter-cooperative modes (joint ventures 
and associations). Accordingly, long-term comparative efficiency of cooperatives 
diminishes considerably in relation to other modes for organization (market, 
contracts, partnerships, and alliances), and 60% of them have gone bankrupt or 
ceased to exist after 2000.  
Most of the existing cooperatives will be sustained in years to come since 
they will keep their production and organizational advantages to a large number of 
petite landowners, rural labor, and small and subsistent farms. What is more, they 
have a greater potential to explore economies of scale and scope on 
institutionally-determined investment, adapt to formal requirements for support, 
and use expertise and finance to execute public projects.  
Furthermore, diverse and considerable CAP support measures (direct and 
agro-ecology payments, investment subsidies, and rural development projects) 
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give a new opportunity to mitigate the co-op’s funding problem. Direct payments 
for instance, allow the extension of activities and offer attractive rent, while 
access to investment subsidies lets farms become modernized and enhances 
competitiveness. Cooperatives have been among the biggest beneficiaries of EU 
and national direct payments in the fist years after the EU accession. Besides, 
some environmental, infrastructural, and rural development projects, which 
require large collective actions and coalition of resources, could be effectively 
initiated, coordinated, and carried by the existing cooperatives or mix (co-op-
private and co-op-public) modes. That will extend and intensify transactions 
governed by existing cooperatives.  
Adaptability of cooperatives to new challenges would be significantly 
increased through public training of their staffs in business and agro-
environmental management, carrying out an effective control on co-ops’ activities 
and providing assistance in farm and cooperative associations. 
 
 
3.3. SUSTAINABILITY OF SMALL-SCALE FARMS 
 
Unregistered holdings are predominantly small-scale farms comprising the 
biggest portion of all farms (Table 1 and Figure 14) and agricultural 
employment88.  
Most private farms evolved after 1989 when agricultural land was restituted 
and assets of large public farms distributed or privatized. Agrarian reform turned 
most households into owners of farmland, livestock, equipment, etc. Internal 
organization of available household resources in one’s own farm was an effective 
way to overcome great institutional and economic uncertainty and minimize costs 
of transacting [Bachev, 2006].  
Private rights on most of the farmlands were not entirely restituted until 2000, 
making market trade with land very difficult or impossible. Besides, there was 
“oversupply” of farmland and the effective demand was not immense. In the 
meantime, many Bulgarians lost their jobs as a result of privatization of public 
farms and industrial companies. Starting up one’s own farm was the most 
effective (or only) mode for productive use of available resources (free labor, 
land, and technological know-how). Moreover, a large portion of people was at 
pre-retired or retired age and had no other job alternatives. For others, farming 
was a stable, “temporary” or secondary means of employment in conditions of 
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 Accordingly, 95% of the employed persons and 92% of the Annual Work Units of the sector 
[MAF]. 
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high insecurity in the job market. Diversification into farming took place and now 
farming is the “sole or major employment” just for a quarter of “engaged persons 
in agriculture”, while, for almost 1 million, it is an “additional source of income” 
[MAF]. 
During the transition, market or contract trade of household capital (land, 
labor, and money) was either impossible or very expensive due to “missing” 
markets, high uncertainty, risk, asymmetry of information, opportunism in time of 
hardship, little job opportunities, and security. Moreover, low payoff from outside 
trade (high inflation, non- or delayed payment of pensions, wages, and rents) was 
combined with an increased share of the household’s food costs. Therefore, 
internal organization was the most effective way of protecting and getting a return 
on resources and securing a stable income.  
Long-term tradition with “personal plots” during the Communist period, and 
insignificant costs for acquiring specialized knowledge (information, training, and 
learning by doing experience) made development costs for owning a farm 
accessible for everybody. In addition, there has been great (price, quantity, and 
quality) uncertainty associated with the market supply of basic foods (many new 
suppliers, no reputation built, poor assortment, insufficient enforcement of 
quality, and safety standards). For lots of consumers, an internal organization 
(own production) has been an effective mode to guarantee cheap, stable, safe, and 
high quality delivery of food. Also, for many Bulgarians, farming activity 
happens to be a favorable full-time or free-time occupation. 
Unregistered farms are not a unified group since there is numerous subsistent 
and semi-market farms as well as highly-commercialized small to middle-size 
enterprises. The best part of Bulgarian farms are subsistent and semi- market 
farms. According to the last census, less than 39% of unregistered farms 
reportedly sell products, and, in more than 50% of the cases, those are surplus, not 
consumed by households [MAF]. Consequently, a significant portion of the entire 
output of vegetables, fruits, vine, and livestock is for “self consumption”.  
Governing of small-scale and subsistent farms is not associated with 
significant costs. Unregistered farms are predominately individual or family 
holdings, and farm size is exclusively determined by the available household 
resources – family labor and own farmland and finance. Internal governing costs 
are insignificant because transactions are between family members (common 
goals, high confidence, and no cheating behavior dominates) or non-existent (one-
person farm). Costs for coordination and organization of activities are not big as 
primitive technologies are applied; (internal) demand and potential are known; 
and common objectives, cooperating behavior, and high trust governs relations 
between family members. 
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A small collective organization for some activities is also practiced - e.g. a 
group pasture of animals, common guarding of yields, and common processing 
and marketing. That allows a partial specialization and division of labor, 
exploration of economies of scale and scope, and/or makes part-time farming 
possible. This form is cost-effective since transactions are not complicated, easily 
controlled, and between close friends, neighbors, and relatives (here mutual trust 
and self-restriction of opportunism govern relations). 
Occasional outside supply of some inputs (seeds and chemicals) and services 
(veterinary) take place, but they are not connected with significant costs because 
of highly standardized and not farm-specific character (many suppliers). On the 
other hand, highly specific to farm transactions, the feed supply for animals, and  
mechanization and irrigation services are effectively secured through a joint 
ownership mode such as cooperative or group farming.  
“Marketing” of the output for subsistent and semi-subsistent farms is not 
associated with considerable costs because most of it is for internal household 
consumption or processing. Exceeds are exchanged with relatives and friends, or 
sold at local (farmers’ or street) markets, to regional middlemen,or processors. In 
any case, low volume, high frequency, and personal character of the transactions 
(clientalization) minimize the costs of marketing.  
There are also a good number of small-scale commercial (market-oriented) 
farms among the unregistered holdings. They are mainly in labor-intensive 
productions such as vegetables, tobacco, vineyards, berries, melons, flowers, 
mushrooms, medicinal and aromatic crops, livestock, sericulture, bee-keeping, 
and in natural meadows. Those are individual or family enterprises, and farmers 
have strong incentives to adapt to market demand and increase productivity 
(through intensification of work and investments in human and material assets) 
since they own the whole residuals (income). Owning a farm enterprise has been a 
secure mode for providing (full or part-time) employment for household members 
(including retired, housewives, and children). Family organization is also an 
effective form for the intergeneration transfer of farm-specific intangible assets 
such as know-how, learning by doing experience, reputation, etc. 
The extension of farms through outside supply of labor and services is 
restricted since directing, monitoring, and disputing costs are extremely high in 
labor-demanding and spatially-dispersed productions. External financing of 
farming via debt, equity sell-off, or preferential public programs has been out of 
reach because of the high costs for preparing project proposals; for meeting 
formal (paperwork, ownership, and co-financing) requirements; and for 
“arranging” funding. That has been additionally complicated by the big 
transacting uncertainty, asymmetry of information, and strong specificity 
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(“berried in land”) and risk (“mobile character”) of investments in agriculture. 
Thus, possibility for effective farm enlargement and growth in productivity 
through mechanization and the application of chemicals and innovation is limited 
by the small internal investment capacities (savings and profit). As a result, 
outdated technologies, low productivity, and poor quality, labor, animal-welfare, 
and environmental standards prevail.  
Low-cost outside land supply (leasing) is practiced to explore economies of 
scale on existing assets, and integrate the critical inputs supply (such as forage for 
livestock). For external supply of indispensable inputs and services, market 
suppliers or ownership modes (cooperative and group farming) is typically used 
according to the level of specificity of supply. In many instances, they are not 
provided at an efficient scale due to the enormous costs of delivery as they are for 
pesticides, fertilizers, irrigation, extensions, etc. 
In some intensive areas (e.g. off-season vegetables and fruits, horticulture, 
melons), small-scale farming has been quite effective in quality and price 
competition, bringing good income for households. Profitability of these farms 
has been especially big when special nationwide organizations exist for marketing 
(e.g. bee honey); production planning and price support (e.g. quotas and 
guaranteed prices for tobacco); and inputs supply and marketing (e.g. sericulture).  
When symmetrical (capacity, quality, and time of delivery) dependency is in 
place, then tight marketing or interlinked89 contracts with downward partners 
(processors, supermarkets, and exporters) have developed, which govern 
transactions effectively (in dairy and vegetables). Principally, marketing of output 
is not associated with considerable costs for commodity and locally-demanded 
products because of short distance, low volume, high frequency, and personal 
character of transactions. Besides, some products of small farms (fresh fruits and 
vegetables and dairy and meat products) enjoy increasing demand because of the 
low level of intensification (reduced or no chemical use and extensive breeding of 
animals), high quality, freshness and good taste, authentic local varieties, and 
bigger confidence of consumers about safety and origin.  
Nevertheless, the majority of small commercial farms is vulnerable and has 
poor mechanisms to protect itself from outside institutional, market, and natural 
disturbances. Most of them have little ability to meet institutional and market 
restrictions, bare risks, and safeguard themselves against natural and market 
hazards (buying insurance, diversifying, or cooperating). All these result in 
significant income variation for individual farms, (sub) sectors, and different 
years. 
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 Typically, marketing against credit and inputs and/or extension supply. 
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A great number of small-scale farms face great transacting difficulties in 
marketing of their output. Most often they are not preferable partners for big 
buyers because of small volume and less-standardized character of output, and 
impossibility (unaffordable costs) to verify quality of products through laboratory 
tests and certificates. On the other hand, official wholesale markets have been 
inaccessible for these farms for reason of great distance, high fees, and 
requirements for volume, special preparation, and certification, etc. Besides, small 
farms frequently experience problems with meeting contractual terms (none or 
delayed payment), huge market price fluctuation, (quasi-) monopolistic situations, 
and missing markets in remote regions.  
In order to protect transacting and avoid unwanted exchanges, the primitive 
forms for risk minimization is commonly used - investment in more universal, but 
less profitable assets, diversification of production, informal cash and carry deals, 
direct retail marketing, etc. With the exception of tobacco producers,90 
development of effective collective organizations for risk sharing, price 
negotiation, marketing, or lobbying for public support has been difficult because 
of high transacting costs and diversified interests of individual farmers (old-
young; larger or smaller size; and specialized or diversified, etc.). 
Different fractions of the unregistered farms are with unequal sustainability. 
Unlike other forms of organization, the life-cycle of a one-person (family) farm is 
greatly determined by the age of the entrepreneur. Thus, farms are unsustainable 
when farmers are close to the end of working age, and they have no heir wishing 
to take up the farm or have more than one successor wanting to get the 
enterprises91. Moreover, incentives for long-term investment in specialized assets 
for increasing sustainability is low for older farmers since there is no secondary 
market for farm-specific assets (such as investments in human capital, training, 
know-how, good reputation, organizational modernization, and positive 
externalities). For that reason a good number of small-scale commercial farms 
will operate at low sustainable levels (at present or smaller scales) given that most 
of farm managers and laborers are old in age92.  
The EU integration and CAP implementation will also foster the restructuring 
of commercial farms according to modern market, technological, and institutional 
standards. Most small-scale livestock farms will hardly meet the EU (hygiene, 
quality, veterinary, phito-sanitary, environmental, and animal welfare) standards 
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 Having a significant political representation and public support. 
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 Disputes between heirs about agricultural lands are widespread and that is a major factor for the 
big fragmentation of land ownership and farms in Bulgaria. 
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 Farm managers older than 45 and 65 are 85% and 40% accordingly [MAF].  
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and have to cease the formal commercial activity by the end of 2009. Only a few 
livestock farms will be able to increase their present size with additional 
specialized investments in modern technologies, food safety, animal welfare, and 
environmental protection. That would enhance their capability to compete, meet 
strict institutional restrictions, and participate in various public support programs. 
Increased scale of operations will also require some stable forms for governing of 
marketing such as cooperation or tight contracts with the dairy and meat 
processing industries.  
A process of consolidation and modernization is taking place in some 
horticultural farms as well. In years to come, market, contract, and institutional 
uncertainty will be steadily diminishing, while access to public support programs 
augments with the application of CAP measures. That will further enhance 
sustainability of smaller-scale, intensive family operations. In some cases, small 
partnership, group farming or vertical integration by buyer (e.g. processor and 
exporter) will be used to achieve rapid concentration of capital and labor.  
Tobacco farms are located in mountainous and less-developed regions with 
little farmland and no alternative job opportunities. They will continue to enjoy 
high public support because of the political power (preferential production or 
regional support policies). However, due to the global tendency for declining 
demand and restriction in production (quotas), the restructuring of this sub-sector 
is inevitable. Thus, modernization and diversification with no significant changes 
in the mode of organization (specialized small-scale family operation) will occur.  
The strong competition will be predictably connected with decreasing the 
number of small commercial farms of various types as a result of take-overs, joint 
ventures, failures, or non-market orientations. There will be also a parallel 
tendency toward specialization into productions for “niche markets” and products 
with special quality (specific origins, organic products, eggs from freely-bred 
chicken, meat with low fat levels, and grape for special wines). That will require 
investments with increasing or high specificity to a particular buyer(s), and 
“integrated” management of farming, processing industries, food chains, 
exporting (associated with specification of production technologies, products 
quality and quantity, time of harvesting and delivery, etc.). Besides, some 
diversification of enterprises into related activities (trade with origins, agro-
tourism, etc.) as modes for dealing with market risk should be expected. And 
finally, high inter-(cite, capacity, quality, etc.) dependency will require expansion 
of the modes for vertical integration with downstream industries [Bachev and 
Nanseki]. 
Preliminary assessments of likely impact of the CAP implementation in 
Bulgaria indicate that income, technological, environmental, and social 
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discrepancies between farms in different sub-sectors and regions, and between 
small holdings and larger operators, will further augment [Bachev, 2008]. The 
enhancement of sustainability of small-scale commercial farms would be 
considerably accelerated through a third-part public involvement in training and 
extension education, assisting in farm association, and increasing accessibility to 
various support programs (improving transparency, decreasing bureaucratic 
procedures, providing preferences for small-scale enterprises, young producers, 
and disadvantages regions).  
At the same time, restructuring a large portion of smaller-scale and subsistent 
farms will have no positive effect. There has been a significant diminution of 
institutional and market uncertainty in recent years. However, most of the factors 
that brought to existence the subsistent and semi-market farming persist – high 
economic insecurity and unemployment, low income and purchasing power of 
households, limited demand for agrarian resources and products, and uncertainty 
associated with market supply of food (freshness, safety, quality, and price). The 
situation has even worsened as a result of the present global economic and 
financial crises.  
Most subsistent farms have no intention of increasing their size because of 
other major occupations and income sources, limits of household demands and 
resources, the advanced age of farmers, etc. Transaction costs to enlarge farms 
through outside supply of additional land, labor, finance, and marketing are 
extremely high (no entrepreneurial capital exists). Vast costs for studying and 
respecting new institutional restrictions (laws, regulations, quality, veterinary, 
eco, animal welfare, etc. standards) and for establishing “relations” with agrarian 
bureaucracy (registrations, certifications, and paper works) is also restrictive. 
Moreover, more than one half of those employed in agriculture are in pre-
retirement or retirement age [MAF]. That puts serious restrictions on effective 
farm adjustment and enlargement - low investment activity and entrepreneurship, 
limited training capacities, and no alternative employment opportunities.  
On the other hand, it is practically impossible for the government to enforce 
the official standards in that huge informal sector of the economy. What is more, 
there is a strong political pressure to relax application of EU rules in non-market 
farm transacting (respect voters’ interests). Therefore, the majority of subsistent 
farms will be highly sustainable in years to come. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Deepening the labor specialization and cooperation and exchanges between 
agents opens up enormous opportunities for socio-economic growth. However, it 
is also associated with significant transaction costs which might disturb 
sustainable development. In the traditional (Neoclassical Economics) framework 
with no transacting costs, there is only one mechanism for the governing of 
relations between individuals and agrarian development. “Free market prices” 
(and market competition) effectively coordinate and stimulate the all activity of 
resource owners, entrepreneurs, and consumers. Accordingly all farms constantly 
“adapt” to price movements and social demands, being equally efficient and 
sustainable. Rare cases of market “failures” are also recognized (“negative 
externalities” and “tragedy of commons”), but a perfect “government 
intervention” is seen as a remedy. All that leads to an interrupted global 
sustainable development (maximum growth in productivity and welfare). 
In the real economy, there are additional important factors affecting 
individual choices and agrarian sustainability (namely institutions and transacting 
costs), and a great variety of effective governing mechanisms. The institutional 
environment is a crucial factor, which eventually determines the “type” of 
development and the “level” of agrarian sustainability. The individual agents tend 
(have) to govern available resources in the most economical way, adapting to 
market, institutional and natural environment, and minimizing the total 
(production, consumption, and transaction) costs.  
Depending on the personal characteristics of agents and the critical attributes 
of each activity, there will be a spectrum of effective structure for organization of 
agrarian resources, activities and exchanges – some will be governed by the 
“invisible market hand”, others by special contract forms, some by the “visible 
manager hand”, or within complex hierarchies, others will be supported by a 
third-party, etc. Accordingly, individual agents will introduce new initiatives, 
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compete in the market place, contract private arrangements, cooperate with others 
(competitors, vertical partners, and interested parties) to take advantage of market, 
technological, institutional and natural opportunities (and restrictions), and 
achieve their particular goals.  
Consequently, at any given period of time, farms and agrarian organizations 
of various types and size would persist (sustain) in agriculture - subsistent, family, 
cooperative, corporative, hybrid, etc. However, the sustainable development does 
not exclude a fundamental modernization of farming structures – size adjustment, 
transformation, coalition, and disappearance of certain farms.  
Our new framework helps us better understand the factors for sustainable 
development and the “government’s role” as well. The analyses of transaction 
costs identify an immense range of “market failures” associated with unspecified 
or badly specified property rights; inefficient systems for enforcement of absolute 
and contracted rights; high uncertainty and dependency of activity; and low 
appropriation of rights. The economic agents deal with market deficiencies 
developing different non-market forms for effective governance (contracts, 
internal modes, collective actions, etc.). Nonetheless, the private sector also 
“fails” to safeguard individual rights and carry out certain activities on an  
effective scale. That is particularly true for human and eco-rights, technological 
and infrastructural development, management of non-renewable resources, 
environmental conservation activity, etc. Thus, there is a strong need for a third-
party public involvement in market and private transactions though institutional 
modernization, assistance, regulation, hybrid or public organization.  
However, diverse forms of public interventions are with unequal efficiency 
and the most efficient one is to be selected taking into account the overall 
transaction costs and contribution to sustainable development. What is more, at 
the present stage, most public interventions increasingly require concerted actions 
(multilateral and multilevel governance) at local, regional, national, transnational, 
and global scales. Nevertheless, “government failure” is also possible and 
inappropriate involvements, under or over-regulations, mismanagement, 
corruption, etc. are widespread around the world. Agrarian sustainability is 
significantly compromised when the market and the private sector fails, and no 
effective public intervention takes place - imperfect institutional structure is not 
reformed, delayed or bad government interventions prevail, fruitless international 
assistance dominate, and needed global governance is not established. 
The comparative institutional and transaction costs analysis of the 
environmental governance in Bulgarian agriculture has let us specify the driving 
factors for the emergence and persistence of environmental problems (risks), and 
makes a more realistic forecast about the eco development. Contemporary 
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development of agriculture is associated with specific (and quite different from 
other European states) environmental challenges, with some of them reaching up 
to the point of no or limited management. That has been a result of the specific 
institutional and governing structure evolving in the sector during the past 20 or 
so years.  
Our analysis also shows that implementation of the common EU policies is 
having unlikely results in “Bulgarian” conditions. In short and medium term, it 
will enlarge income, technological, social and environmental discrepancy between 
different farms, sub-sectors and regions. In the longer-term, environmental 
hazard(s) caused by the agricultural development will enlarge unless effective 
public and private measures are taken to mitigate the existing environmental 
problems. What is more, the specific structures for effective governance of 
farming (such as subsistence farming, production cooperatives, small-scale 
commercial farms, and large business firms) will continue to dominate in years to 
come. Nevertheless, a significant improvement of public (government, EU, etc.) 
interventions is needed in order to enhance the sustainability of prospective farms 
and sustainable agrarian development. More specifically, implementation of EU 
common policies would have no desired impacts (on socio-economic 
development, regional and sectoral discrepancies, flows of agro-ecosystem 
services, etc.) unless special measures are taken to improve management of public 
programs, and extend public support to dominating small-scale and subsistence 
farms. 
The identification of efficiency, complementarities, and sustainability of 
different modes of environmental governance has a substantial importance for the 
amelioration of public policies, business strategies, and individual’s and collective 
actions. Firstly, it helps anticipate possible cases of market, private sector, and 
public (community, government, and international assistance) failures, and 
designs appropriate modes for public intervention. In particular, it facilitates the 
formulation of specific policies and institutional framework to overcome the 
existing environmental problems, safeguards against the possible eco-risks, and 
avoids the severe environmental challenges in other developed countries. Next, it 
could assist individual, business, and collective actions, and organizational 
modernization in the agrarian sphere for successful adaptation to changing 
economic, institutional and natural environments.  
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bachev, H. (2004). Efficiency of Agrarian Organizations, Farm Management and 
Rural Planning No 5, Fukuoka: Kyushu University Press, 135-150. 
Bachev, H. (2006). Governing of Bulgarian Farms – Modes, Efficiency, Impact of 
EU Accession, in J.Curtiss, A.Balmann, K.Dautzenberg and K.Happe 
(editors), Agriculture in the Face of Changing Markets, Institutions and 
Policies: Challenges and Strategies” (pp.133-149). Halle (Saale): IAMO.  
Bachev, H. (2007). Governing of Agrarian Sustainability, ICFAI Journal of 
Environmental Law, Vol.VI, No 2, Hyderabad: ICFAI University, 7-25. 
Bachev, H. (2008). Management of Environmental Challenges and Sustainability 
of Bulgarian Agriculture, in P.Liota, D.Mouat, W.Kepner, and J.Lancaster 
(editors), Environmental Challenges and Human Security: Recognizing and 
Acting on Hazard Impacts (pp.117–142). The Netherlands: Springer. 
Bachev, H. (2009). Governing of Agro-ecosystem Services. Modes, Efficiency, 
Perspectives. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag. 
Bachev, H. and Kagatsume, M. (2006). Assessment of Farm Support Policies and 
Likely Impact of CAP Implementation on Farm Structures and Sustainability 
in Bulgaria, The Natural Resource Economics Review No 11, Kyoto: Kyoto 
University Press, 173-192. 
Bachev, H. and Labonne, M. (2000). About Agrarian Innovations, Montpellier: 
INRA.  
Bachev, H. and Manolov I. (2007). Inclusion of small scale dairy farms in the 
supply chain in Bulgaria (a case study from the Plovdiv region), Regoverning 
Markets Innovative Practice series, London: International Institute for 
Environment and Development. 
Bachev, H. and Nanseki, T. (2008). Risk Governance in Bulgarian Dairy Farming, 
paper presented at the 12th Congress of the European Association of 
Agricultural Economists “People, Food and Environments – Global Trends 
References 108 
and European Strategies”, 26-29 August 2008, Ghent. 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/44136/2/240.pdf. 
Bachev, H. and Peeters, A. (2005). Framework for Assessing Sustainability of 
Farms, Farm Management and Rural Planning No 6, Fukuoka: Kyushu 
University, 221-239. 
Berge, E. and Stenseth, N. (editors) (1998). Law and the Governance of 
Renewable Resources. Studies from Northern Europe and Africa, Oakland: 
ICS Press.  
Berkowicz, S. (2009). Challenges, Opportunities and Dilemmas for Coping with 
Environmental Security in Drylands, paper presented at the NATO ARW on 
“Achieving Environmental Security: Ecosystem Services and Human 
Welfare”, July 6-10, 2009, Newport. 
Coase, R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4,386-405. 
Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Costs, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 
1-44. 
COST (2009). COST Foresight 2030 – Proceedings of Parallel Workshops on 
Energy, Food Security, Life Enhancement and Natural Resources 
Management, 30 June - 02 July 2009, Brugge. 
Dahlman, C.(1979). The problem of Externality, Journal of Law and Economics, 
22. 141-162. 
Daily, G. (editor) (1997). Nature's Services: Societal Dependence on Natural 
Ecosystems. Washington: Island Press. 
Daily, G., Söderqvist, T., Aniyar, S., Arrow, K., Dasgupta, P., Ehrlich, P., Folke, 
C., Jansson, A., Jansson, B., Kautsky, N., Levin, S., Lubchenco, J., Mäler, K., 
Simpson, D., Starrett, D., Tilman, D. and Walker, B. (2000). The value of 
nature and the nature of value. Science 289, 395-396. 
Demsetz, H. (1969). Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 12, 1-22. 
Dupraz, P., Latouch, K. and Bonnieux F. (2004). Economic Implications of Scale 
and Threshold Effects in Agri-environmental Processes, paper presented at 
the 90 EAAE Seminar, 27-29 October 2004, Rennes.  
Edwards, C., Lal, R., Madden, P., Miller R. and House, G. (editors) (1990). 
Sustainable Agricultural System., Iowa: Soil and Water Conservation Society. 
EEA (2007), Annual State of the Environment Report 2006. Sofia: Executive 
Environment Agency. 
EC (2005). Agri-environment Measures, Overview on General Principles, Types 
of Measures, and Application. Evaluation of Measures applied to Agriculture 
Studies. European Commission, Directorate General for Agriculture and 
Rural Development.  
References 109 
ECOTEC (2001). Study on the Economic and Environmental Implications of the 
Use of Environmental Taxes and Charges in the EU and its Member Sates. 
Brussels: ECOTEC Research and Consulting.  
Furuboth, E. and Richter, R. (1998). Institutions and Economic Theory: The 
Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press.  
Grigorova Y. and Kazakova, Y. (2008). High Nature Value farmlands: 
Recognizing the importance of South East European landscapes, Case study 
report, Western Stara Planina, WWF Danube-Carpathian Programme and 
European Forum on Nature Conservation and Pastoralism. 
Hagedorn, K. (editor) (2002). Environmental Cooperation and Institutional 
Change. Cheltenham: Edward Edgar.  
Hanson, C, Ranganathan, J., Iceland, C. and Finisdore, J. (2008). The Corporate 
Ecosystem Services Review. Guidelines for Identifying Business Risks and 
Opportunities Arising from Ecosystem Change, World Resources Institute. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons, Science Vol. 162. no. 3859, 
1243-1248. 
Martinez, S. (2002). A Comparison of Vertical Coordination in the U.S. Poultry, 
Egg, and Pork Industries, Current Issues in Economics of Food Markets, 
Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 747-05, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service. 
MAF (2008). Agrarian paper. Sofia: Ministry of Agriculture and Food.  
MEW (2008). Official papers. Sofia: Ministry of Environment and Water.  
Mirovitskaya, N. and Ascher W. (editors) (2001). Guide to Sustainable 
Development and Environmental Policy. London: Duke University Press. 
Mori, T. (1991). The History of Japanese Agriculture, in Agricultural Policy in 
Japan, XXI IAAE Conference, Tokyo.  
NSI (2008). Statistical Book. Sofia: National Statistical Institute.  
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Olson, M. (1969). The Logic of Collective Actions: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. 
OECD (2000). Review of Agricultural Policies in Bulgaria. Paris and Sofia: 
OECD.  
OECD (2001). Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework. Paris: 
OECD. 
OECD (2008). Conducting Sustainability Assessments. Paris: OECD. 
References 110 
Pigou, A. (1920). Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan and Co.  
Raman, S. (2006). Agricultural Sustainability. Principles, Processes and 
Prospect., New York: The Haworth Press Inc.  
Rochon, G. (2009). Real-time Remote Sensing in Support of Environmental 
Security: A NATO Sponsored Partnership among Academic Institutions in 
Egypt, Turkey and the USA, paper presented at the NATO ARW on 
“Achieving Environmental Security: Ecosystem Services and Human 
Welfare”, July 6-10, 2009, Newport.. 
Salazar, A. and Rios, I. (editors) (2010). Sustainable Agriculture: Technology, 
Planning and Management, New York: Nova Science. 
Sauvenier, X., Valekx, J., Van Cauwenbergh, N., Wauters, E., Bachev, H., Biala, 
K., Bielders, C., Brouckaert, V., Garcia-Cidad, V., Goyens, S., Hermy, M., 
Mathijs, E., Muys, B., Vanclooster, M., and Peeters, A. (2005). Framework 
for Assessing Sustainability Levels in Belgium Agricultural Systems – SAFE. 
Final Report. Brussels: Belgium Science Policy. 
Sporleder, T. (1992). Managerial Economics of Vertically Coordinated 
Agricultural Firms, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vo l 74, No 
5, 1226-1231.  
UN (1992). Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, 3-14 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro: UN. 
VanLoon, G., Patil, S., and Hugar, L. (2005). Agricultural Sustainability: 
Strategies for Assessment. London: SAGE Publications.  
Vassilev, Hr., Christov, C., Hristova, V., and Neshev B. (2007). Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in Republic of Bulgaria 1988, 1990-2005, National Inventory 
Report 2005, Sofia: Ministry of Environment and Water. 
Williamson, O. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
